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PREFACE
We do not seek the destruction ofany government nor do we covet afoot o f territory... but we
insist and we will always insist that the people o f South Vietnam shall have the right or the
choice to shape their own destiny...and they shall not have any government imposed upon
them by force and terror as long as we can prevent it...we did not choose to be guardians at
the gate , but there is nobody else.1
Lyndon Johnson speaking at aWhite House
press conference on July 28 1965.

July 1965 was a troubling month for Lyndon Baines Johnson. The President's time
was increasingly being taken up by disturbing events in South Vietnam. LBJ was committed
to defending this nascent country against a Communist insurgency which he believed was
directed by the insidious North Vietnamese and the Chinese Communists. Every day, fresh
news of disasters on the South Vietnamese side would be patched through to the White House
Situation Room or would flash across the teleprinters installed in the Oval Office. It was
becoming clear that South Vietnam was on the brink o f collapse. Lyndon Johnson grew
restless. He was now aware that he would have to send large numbers o f US troops, the flower
of American youth, into battle. After conferring with his trusted advisers and much personal
agonising, the President had decided that he would allow US ground troops to be sent to the
region to deny the Communists victory. On July 28 1965 he summoned the White House
1 Public Papers of the Presidents. Lyndon B. Johnson. 1965 ( Washington, 1966 )p.388 President's Press Conference
o f M y 28 1965

press corps and announced that he would not renege on his country's commitment to the
freedom of South Vietnam. The US Commander, William C. Westmoreland, who had
requested US troops to bolster the South Vietnamese would receive an extra fifty thousand
troops immediately, (thus taking the total number of Americans serving in Vietnam to
125,000) But the President did not share with the press or the country exactly how many
troops he was prepared to send altogether to Vietnam. He ambiguously added that more
troops would be sent if needed. By failing to place limits on the US role in Vietnam, Lyndon
Johnson had unknowingly made an open-ended commitment to Vietnam which would lead to
the presence of half a million men in South Vietnam by 1968, and would make Johnson one of
the most unpopular Presidents in American history. In March o f 1968, exhausted by the
burdens o f the Vietnam war, Johnson announced to a deeply divided nation that he would not
seek re-election that November.
The aim of this thesis is to establish the motives for the President's decision to expand
the war in South Vietnam which ultimately destroyed his career, and tore his country apart.
This paper will approach this topic thematically. It will examine the role of ideology and
beliefs in the decision-making process, and how far it contributed to Johnson's decision to
escalate the war in 1965. It will also consider the the advice rendered to the President by his
advisers, and how the relationship between the President and his main advisers influenced the
way in which he viewed their advice. Furthermore, this thesis will explore the impact of other
influences on the formulation of US policy in Vietnam. The role of the US armed forces, the
US ambassador and outsiders such as Senator Mike Mansfield and Clark Clifford played in
the decision will all be discussed here. This piece of work will also attempt to discover how far

domestic politics, and in particular Johnson's own deep-rooted commitment to domestic
social reform, influenced his handling o f the Vietnam war. The thesis will also seek to
establish how far international politics shaped the course of action pursued by the President.
This topic has obviously been covered by other historians, and this paper will take account of
some of the debates provoked by authors on this topic. In particular it will address the debate
on the Gulf of Tonkin incidents, on the President's failure to inform the American people that
they were at war in Vietnam, and Johnson's treatment of his principal advisers. Finally a brief
conclusion will collate these themes.
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ABSTRACT
In July 1965 President Lyndon Johnson escalated the war in Vietnam by dispatching
large numbers of US troops to the country. His commitment o f US troops drew the United
States deeper into the quagmire of South Vietnam and created deep discontent and division at
home.
The aim of this thesis was to establish the reasons for President Johnson's decision to
initially wage an aerial campaign against the North Vietnamese, and later to massively
increase the number o f US ground forces in South Vietnam in July 1965.
This thesis has concluded that the anti-Communist ideology o f the President and his
advisers contributed to the decision to intervene in Vietnam. The inability of the South
Vietnamese to effectively wage war against the Communist Viet Cong and North Vietnamese
caused the President to believe that if he failed to intervene, Vietnam and Southeast Asia
would be lost to the Communists. Furthermore, almost all of the President's advisers
recommended that he launch an aerial campaign against the North Vietnamese, and send US
ground forces to the region. Their advice had a massive impact on a President who was
inexperienced and unsure of himself in foreign policy. Finally, the belief of the President that
the United States' global reputation would be seriously damaged by a failure to fight the
Communist insurgency in South Vietnam made it extremely difficult for him to withdraw from
Vietnam.

CROSSING THE RUBICON: LBJ AND
VIETNAM 1963-1965

INTRODUCTION
la m not going to lose Vietnam. Iam not going to be the President who saw Southeast Asia go
the way China went.
Lyndon Baines Johnson speaking shortly after
his accession to the Presidency in 1963.

President Lyndon Baines Johnson asserted that the fear of an international
Communist conspiracy which prevailed within his administration, in combination with the
collapse of the South Vietnam government during the period 1964-1965 left him with little
option but to escalate the war in Vietnam. His opponents contended that LBJ was the
President who duped the American Congress and the public into giving him a blank cheque for
the war he so desperately wanted. In other words, international Communism was little more
than a convenient pretext for the massive US intervention in Vietnam in 1965. This thesis will
argue that the fear of international Communism did prevail within the administration, and
caused the President and his advisers to view the Communist insurgency in South Vietnam
with considerable concern. But this concern on its own could not prompt the decision to
commit US ground forces to the region. The growing inability of the South Vietnamese
government to effectively deal with the Vietcong exacerbated the feeling of anxiety in
Washington; consequently Johnson decided to bomb North Vietnam and to send troops to the
South to bolster the ailing South Vietnamese forces. There was no pre-planned well-
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organised scheme within the administration to enter the war. The Gulf o f Tonkin incident and
the subsequent resolution rammed though Congress by the administration has been seen by
Johnson's enemies as evidence of a plot to drag the United States into a bloody war. This
paper will attempt to show that the Gulf of Tonkin incident was an isolated one and was not
part of some scheme to enter the war in Vietnam. Moreover, this study will contend that the
Johnson administration escalated the conflict to force the North Vietnamese to enter
negotiations. The President's fears of the international repercussions of a withdrawal from
Vietnam also played a significant role in his decision to commit US troops to the region.
Furthermore, almost all of Johnson's advisers recommended escalating the war. Their advice
had a massive impact on the President because he respected and trusted the men he had
inherited from President Kennedy. Ultimately, Lyndon Johnson took the momentous decision
to send troops because o f his beliefs and the circumstances in Vietnam in 1965; if he did not,
his worst fears of Communist China and North Vietnam spreading their revolution
throughout the Far East would be realised.

CHAPTER ONE. LBJ, THE COLD WAR AND SOUTH VIETNAM
The Significance of Cold War Ideology
Lyndon Baines Johnson took the oath of office at a time when Cold War ideology was
still a central tenet of US foreign policy makers and politicians. From 1947 onwards US policy
makers had become firmly convinced o f the existence of an international Communist
conspiracy to achieve world hegemony which they believed ultimately imperilled the security
of the United States.

Consequently Communist agitators were seen by successive US

governments as initially tools of the Soviet Union and later Communist China. National
Security Council Paper 68 ( NSC 68 ) drafted in 1950 represented these opinions. NSC 68
also contended that the United States must meet the Communist threat with force. While
Lyndon Johnson was no diplomat or expert in international affairs, there is little doubt that he
subscribed to the prevailing opinions in foreign policy. As a young Congressman he had
witnessed Soviet aggression in Czechoslovakia and Poland. As a Senator he had seen China
be 'lost* to the Communists, and watched President Eisenhower articulate the domino theory.
He had been an enthusiastic supporter of the Truman Doctrine and Marshall Aid to Europe,
and had been an advocate of a bi-partisan foreign policy.2 Johnson also belonged to the
generation which was heavily critical of the appeasement policies of Neville Chamberlain in

2 this was the belief in the late 1940 and 1950s that foreign policy was above politics, and that both parties should not try
to make political capital by attacking the incumbent President over his conduct of foreign policy.
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the 1930s. For this generation, the Soviet Union and Communist China could not be appeased
in the way Hitler had been at Munich in 1938. In the 1940s as a Congressman, LBJ had drawn
the comparison between the two situations. All of the men who surrounded Johnson were of
the same mentality. Dean Rusk, Robert McNamara, Walt Rostow, McGeorge Bundy, Bill
Bundy and Maxwell Taylor shared a similar outlook in foreign policy. McNamara later said "I
cannot overstate the impact our generation's experiences had on...us."3 Consequently when
they were faced with a Communist insurgency in South Vietnam they viewed it as being part
of a larger conspiracy to subvert the region.
Admittedly the global situation had changed considerably from the 1940s. In the late
1950s Eisenhower and Khrushchev had eased tensions in US-Soviet relations, and in the
aftermath o f the Cuban Missile crisis, a new closer relationship between the Soviet Union and
the United States had been forged. But the fears and ideas of the 1940s still remained
prevalent in the 1960s. The President himself said "in the 1930s we made our fate .. .by what
we failed to do..and there must just be no such failure in the 1960s."4 Furthermore, by the
1960s, the President and his advisers were obsessed by the threat posed by the Communist
Chinese. They had become convinced that the Chinese were the new enemy seeking to extend
their doctrine to the Southeast Asian region. Neither the President nor his advisers bothered
to remember that China had invaded Vietnam in the past, and that the Vietnamese did not look
upon their neighbours with any affection. The events in the region in the 1960s appeared to be

3 R. McNamara, In Retrospect The Tragedy and the Lessons of Vietnam (New York, Random House 1995) p. 195
4 The Pentagon Papers. The Defence Department History o f United States Decision Making on Vietnam Vol IH
(Boston, Beacon Press, 1971) p. 730 Speech by LBJ April 17 1965
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far more compelling evidence o f a Communist plot to subvert the region. Laos which was
technically a neutral country according to the Geneva Accords of 1962 was being infiltrated
by the Communists, Malaya was the scene o f a Communist guerilla uprising against the
British, and Indonesia under Sukarno appeared to be drifting ever closer towards Communist
China.
For Lyndon Johnson and his advisers, the activities of the Viet Cong in South Vietnam
were part of an international conspiracy to subvert not just South Vietnam, but also the entire
South East region. In his first pronouncement on the situation in Vietnam on November 26
1963, in National Security Action Memorandum ( NSAM ) 273, the President referred to the
"externally directed and supported Communist conspiracy," to destroy South Vietnam.5
Secretary of State Dean Rusk subsequently wrote in a memo that "the peace and security of
South East Asia are seriously threatened by a systematic and deliberate campaign of
Communist aggression against the nations and peoples of that area." He concluded by noting
that, the loss of the any nation in South East Asia "would ..pose a direct threat to the security
of the United States. "6 The domino theory articulated back in 1954 by President Eisenhower
which argued that the loss o f one state to Communism would lead to the loss o f neighbouring
states, was still a deep rooted belief of foreign policy makers over a decade later. In an extreme
version o f this theory, the director of the Policy Planning Staff, Walt Rostow predicted that,
the loss of Vietnam would have serious consequences. He argued that "Thailand would no
longer rely on US backing and probably Burma would go to the Communists... "7
5 Declassified Documents Reference System (Hereafter Declassified Documents)National Security Memorandum
NSAM 273 November261963
6 Declassified Documents. Department o f State (Hereafter DOS) . Memo by Dean Rusk, June 11 1964
7 ibid. Letter from Rostow to Dean Rusk, February 13 1964
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Such pessimistic declarations worried the President and caused him to support
continuation of aid; in National Security Action Memorandum 273, he declared that it was
"the central objective o f the United States in South Vietnam to assist the people and the
government to win their contest..."8 In early December, he informed Defense Secretary
Robert S. McNamara that not enough attention was being paid to the pressing problem
inSouth Vietnam, and that he should pay a visit the region. But while LBJ had committed
himself to assisting the South Vietnamese, he was not remotely willing to contemplate the
dispatch o f US troops at this time; in NSAM 273 he reaffirmed "the objective of the United
States with respect to the withdrawal of US military personnel." Johnson was still receiving
overly optimistic assessments of the situation from the US commander Paul Harkins who
reported that the US presence was working and that the troops could leave by the end o f 1965.
Events in South Vietnam soon began to cause alarms within the administration.
Lyndon Johnson's inheritance from his predecessor had not been a good one. South Vietnam
was a former French colony with no tradition of democratic government, and was racked
with factionalism, conspiracies and coups. After the withdrawal of the French from Indochina
in 1954, Vietnam had been divided into two, with Ho Chi Minh's Viet Minh controlling the
north, and the South ruled by the US backed despot Ngo Dinh Diem. Diem's repressive
tactics had effectively stifled this factionalism and political infighting. When the US strong
man, Ngo Dinh Diem was removed from power and assassinated by the Vietnamese military
in November 1963just weeks before Johnson's accession to the Presidency, political

8 Declassified Documents. National Security Action Memorandum NSAM 273 November 261963
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instability had markedly increased.

The new President had not approved o f the US

acquiescence in the coup against Diem. Diem had represented the best hope for a stable
government in LBJ's mind. And Johnson believed that a stable government was essential to
the success o f the South Vietnamese in their battle against the Viet Cong. In his typically
earthy manner, he remarked that, he was " tired of this coup shit."9 For Johnson, a stable
government was one which could keep order, represent the disparate factions and arouse a
degree o f popular support.10Consequently, the new military junta which had replaced Diem
and was headed by General Duong Van Minh was viewed in a sceptical light on account of its
inability to rally any popular support. In his report on his trip to Vietnam in December 1963,
Defense Secretary McNamara was far from positive in his assessment of the new regime. In
his report addressed to the President in December 1963 McNamara wrote that "the new
government is the greatest source of concern. It is indecisive and drifting."11
Some historians have contended that the Johnson administration actually helped to
contribute to the instability by engineering a coup against Minh because of his willingness to
accept the neutralisation of South Vietnam, and negotiate with the Viet Cong.12 George
Kahin in particular suggests that Minh was willing to allow the NLF (the political wing of the
Viet Cong)to participate in an open election, and to ask all foreign troops to leave the region.
The United States found this unacceptable, were openly hostile towards the new government

9 PBS Documentary. Vietnam (1983)
10 Foreign Relations o f the United States Vietnam.1964 (hereafter FRUS) (Washington,US Government Printing
Office, 1992) Record of meeting December 1 1964
11 The Pentagon Papers Vol HI (Boston, Beacon Press, 1971) Memo by Secretary McNamara 16 March 1964 p.504
12 see G. Kahin, Intervention. How America became Involved in Vietnam (New York, Alfred Knopf, 1986)pp.l90202 or M. B. Young, The Vietnam Wars 1945-1990 (New York, Harper and Row, 1991) pp. 106-107
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and encouraged the Vietnamese military to overthrow Minh.13 Minh however, appeared to
want to work with the United States. After meeting Minh Ambassador Henry Cabot Lodge
reported that the new government expressed its desire to work with the US government.14 It
also seems as ifMinh was strongly opposed to any suggestions of neutralisation of his country
and was actually worried that the United States might actually favour such a course of action.
When the New York Times advocated the neutralisation of Vietnam, Generals Minh, Don and
Kim requested a meeting with Ambassador Cabot Lodge to express their fears. Lodge cabled
the Secretary of State informing him that the Vietnamese leaders "pointed to the effect of such
articles on morale of Vietnamese population."15 Minh's hostility to a neutral V ietnam is further
revealed in a report from McNamara which stated "possible neutralisation is strongly
opposed by Minh, and our attitude is somewhat suspect because o f editorials by the New
York Times...we reassured them as strongly as possible on this."16 It is not clear either if
Ambassador Cabot Lodge was hostile to the new government. When General Khanh, the
leader of the coup tried to convince the Ambassador that leading generals in Minh's
government were in favour of neutralisation, Lodge was not persuaded. He stated that they
were patriots and that General Khanh's comments went against his deepest instincts.17 It was
only well after the coup that Lodge accepted Khanh's belief that the government had favoured
neutralisation.

11 G. lCahin^ Intervention. How America became Involved hi Vietnam (New York, Alfred Knopf, 1986)p.201
14 Declassified Documents. Department of State Cable from Ambassador Lodge to Secretary Rusk November 30
1963
15 ibid. Cable from Ambassador Lodge to Secretary Rusk December 1963
16 The Pentagon Papers Boston, Beacon Press, 1971 )p.497 Report by Secretary McNamara 21 December 1963
17 ibid. p.38 Cable from Lodge to Secretary Rusk
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The ambitious General Nguyen Khanh overthrew Minh in January 1964. But the political
instability in South Vietnam did not abate. The squabbling and factionalism within the new
administration of Nguyen Khanh worried the Johnson administration; as long as the South
Vietnamese failed to establish a government which had any support, the Viet Cong would
continue to make inroads and there would be no desire to resist them. The United States
government's concern with the situation in South Vietnam reflected in a resolution drawn up
by Assistant Secretary for Far Eastern Affairs Bill Bundy asking Congress to give the
administration power to strike North Vietnam in case the situation worsened in the South. In
order to further help the South Vietnamese Johnson now authorised the use o f covert
operations (codenamed OPLAN 34A)18; in a telegram to Ambassador Henry Cabot Lodge,
the President declared that Secretary Rusk and Secretary McNamara were in the process of
drawing up plans for pressure against North Vietnam.19
While the President may well have authorised members of his administration to draw
up plans which considered the possible use of force in Vietnam, he showed little interest in
widening the war at this point. These draft resolutions and papers were not in any way
accepted government policy. Rather, they were contingency plans drawn up in the event of
the collapse of South Vietnam. Johnson made his feelings clear in telegram to Ambassador
Henry Cabot Lodge that year where he remarked that "the essential task is to strengthen the
Southem base... our planning for action against NVN is on a contingency basis..." ( emphasis

18 Thesecovert operations included acts o f sabotage and raids carried out by the South Vietnamese
19 Declassified D o cu m en ts DOS Telegram from LBJ to Lodge Feb 211964
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added) 20 Nor were any other members o f the administration enthusiastic about the possibility
of force. In a memo on the subject, NSC adviser McGeorge Bundy wrote that overt measures
should not be considered until covert operations had been tried.21 Even the ruthless
McNamara who would later be called a " hardliner " on Vietnam by McGeorge Bundy, argued
in a memorandum that US troops should not be introduced. He contended that a US military
presence would show that the South Vietnamese were not in control of the insurgency. He
noted that "The possible advantages of such action would be far outweighed by its
psychological impact. It would cut across the picture of the Vietnamese winning the war."22
The United States was still in Vietnam in an advisory capacity. Furthermore it appears as
though the administration was still hoping to withdraw by the end of 1965. In the same
memorandum, the Defence Secretary suggested that "substantial reductions in personnel
should be possible before the end of 1965."23 Johnson and his officials continued to demand
that Khanh clean up the corruption in the South, and establish a viable popular government
before stronger action could be taken. Johnson and his advisers believed that taking overt
measures would be too risky whilst the South was not strong enough to withstand any
possible retaliation from the North.24
The Gulf of T onkin Incident: A step on the road to escalation ?
On August 2 1964, the USS Maddox on an intelligence ( Desoto ) patrol reported that

20 The Pentagon Papers (Boston^Beacon Press 1971)p.511 Telegram from LBJ to Lodge 20 March 1964
21 Declassified Documents DOS Telegram from McGeorge Bundy to LBJ 16 March 1964
22 The Pentagon Papers ( Boston, Beacon Press, 1971 )p.509 memo by Secretary McNamara, 16 March 1964
23 ibid. memo by Secretary McNamara, 16 march 1964 p. 509
24 L. B. Johnson, The Vantage Point. Perspectives o f the Presidency 1963-1969 (New York,Holt, Rinehart and
Winston, 1971) p. 167
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it had been the subject of an attack by North Vietnamese boats. Two days later both the USS
Maddox and C. Turner Joy filed a report of another attack by North Vietnamese boats. The
response of Lyndon Johnson and his administration has been the subject of debate amongst
journalists and historians for the past three decades. Johnson and his main advisers Dean
Rusk, and Robert McNamara have been accused of provoking the incident and of lying to
Congress about the events in the Gulf in order to secure a resolution which would allow the
President to declare war. Historians such as Marilyn B . Young and politicians such as Senator
J. William Fulbright (D-Arkansas) have suggested that the administration simply fabricated
the second attack, and that Defense Secretary McNamara deceived Congress, when he
pointedly referred to the "deliberate and unprovoked attack" of the North Vietnamese, and
when he later stated to Congress that the Maddox and Turner Joy had in fact been the subject
of an attack on August 4th 1964.25
The actions of the administration were not part of a grand scheme to escalate the war,
and were in fact a specific response to the events in the Tonkin Gulf. The Johnson
Administration had not sent the USS Maddox into the Tonkin Gulf to provoke an incident.
The USS Maddox was not part of the covert activities (OPLAN 34A) being conducted by the
CIA and the South Vietnamese. It was on a routine intelligence gathering patrol. Besides,
Lyndon Johnson was not seeking an excuse to escalate the war. The situation in South
Vietnam was not so desperate that force was needed. The Assistant Secretary of State for Far

25 Joint Hearing before the Committee on Foreign Relations and the Committee on Armed Services. United States Senate.
A Joint Resolution to Promote the Maintenance of International Peace and Security in Southeast Asia August 61964
(Washington, US GPO, 1966) p.22
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Eastern Affairs Bill Bundy later admitted in a radio interview that the incident did not fit with
the plans of the administration.26 When Nguyen Khanh had suggested taking the war North,
the President had vetoed such an idea immediately. Even more importantly, LBJ was in the
midst o f the Presidential election campaign, where he sought to portray himself as a man of
moderation in contrast to the bellicose Republican Barry Goldwater. Launching a war would
almost certainly have shattered this image instantly.
Indeed the President's reluctance to initiate a war can be borne out by the course
pursued by the administration; no action was taken in response to the first attack on the USS
Maddox. It was certainly not the most popular decision. Ambassador Maxwell Taylor in
Saigon fired off a cable condemning the President for his inaction, warning him that his failure
would send a signal to the Communists that "we are prepared to accept regular...harassment
in international waters" and that it would "be construed...as an indication that the US flinches
from direct confrontation with the North Vietnamese."27 In his memoirs, Taylor recalled that
he was surprised by "the failure o f the administration to retaliate immediately after the first
attack. "28 And when the President did finally agree to respond to the second attack, he waited
for official confirmation that such an attack had occurred; Defense Secretary McNamara
contacted Admiral Sharp, the Commander of the Pacific forces,( CINCPAC ) and ordered
him to confirm the attack. The President also dispatched his chief lieutenants Dean Rusk and
Robert McNamara to Capitol Hill to secure Congressional approval for his action.

26 M. Charlton, and A. Moncrieff, Many Reasons Why: American Involvement in Vietnam (New York, Hill and
Wang, 1978)p.l 17
27 FRUS Vietnam 1964 (Washington,US GPO, 1992) p.593 Telegram from Taylor to State Department August 31964
28 M. Taylor, Swords and Ploughshares (New York, W. W. Norton,! 972) p.319
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Years later, one of the pilots providing air cover to the US S Maddox claimed that there was no
second attack. Furthermore, at the time, the captain of the ship, Commodore Herrick, had
radioed in a message warning that the initial report of an attack could possibly be erroneous.
Johnson later on conceded to Under Secretary of State George Ball that it may have been
possible that the ships could have been "shooting at flying fish." The most recent historian of
the Gulf of Tonkin incident has concluded that stormy weather conditions had caused radar
operators on the USS Maddox to believe that enemy vessels were preparing to attack. He
concludes that there were no North Vietnamese vessels in the area at this time.29
What is more important is that at the time, the President and his Defense Secretary
had ample reason for believing that such an attack had occurred. Firstly, Commodore Herrick
dispatched a message exactly one hour after his initial warning declaring that he was
convinced that there had indeed been an ambush.

In addition, the administration had

intercepted a North Vietnamese message which indicated that North Vietnamese ships had
been ordered to attack a US ship. In the fevered atmosphere in Washington, this message
appeared to be proof of an attack.30 Even then, McNamara refused to agree to strikes until he
was certain that there had been an attack. He pointedly told Admiral Sharp ( CINCPAC ) that,
"we don't want to do it [launch the retaliatory strike] until we are damned sure about what
happened. "31 Johnson, according to the evidence, was not interested in escalating the

29 E. Moise, Tonkin Gulf and the Escalation of the Vietnam War (Chapel Hill, University o f North Carolina Press,
1996)p.l08
30 M. Charlton, and A. Moncrieff, Many Reasons Why: American Involvement in Vietnam (New York, Hill and
Wang, 1978)p.ll7
31 R. McNamara, In Retrospect (New York, Random House, 1995)p.l34
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conflict. One memo from the director of the Policy Planning Staff Walt Rostow referred to
the "evident desire of President Johnson to limit the ...conflict."32 Assistant Secretary for
International Security Affairs in the Defense Department, John McNaughton noted that the
United States had attacked only patrol craft and installations.33 And Maxwell Taylor
dispatched a cable from Saigon noting that the retaliation was " in effect an isolated US-DRV
incident."34 Besides, the President had no desire to widen the war; as well as being
preoccupied with the election, he was also fearful at this time that the response he had ordered
would provoke Chinese intervention. The President went on television to speak about the US
attack, not to inform the American people, but to inform the Chinese that this was not attack
on them or an act of w ar.35
Indeed, the whole incident had shaken the President and made him less willing to
become involved in this conflict. Just over a month later, another US ship dispatched a report
to Washington that it might have been attacked by North Vietnamese vessels. In the cabinet
room, Johnson polled the opinions of his advisers. Rusk and McNamara were in a particularly
self righteous mood, and argued that this event deserved a retaliatory response. Johnson
listened intently, before speaking. He was not convinced, he told them, that there had been an
attack. The evidence appeared flimsy to him. He did not believe that there had even been a
hostile vessel in the region. The President then ruled out any action.36

32 Declassified Documents DOS Memo by Walt Rostow 5 August 1964
33 ibid. Memo by John McNaughton 7 August 196
34 The Pentagon Papers (Boston,Beacon Press, 1971 ) p. 523
35 L. B. Johnson, The Vantage Point. Perspectives o f the Presidency 1963-1969 (New York, Holt Rinehart and
Winston, 1971) p.117
36 Declassified Documents.White House File Memo of meeting by McGeorge Bundy September 16 1964
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Some authors have argued that Johnson misled Congress into granting him such sweeping
powers by the Gulf o f Tonkin resolution. Under this resolution, the President was authorised
by Congress to take any measure to repel any attacks on US forces and any further
aggression.37 But Congress seems to have been aware of the power it was granting the
President. When Senator Cooper asked J. William Fulbright if the Committee was effectively
giving the President the right to go to war by their resolution, Senator Fulbright, the Chairman
of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee,(who would later become one o f L B J's main
opponents over Vietnam) replied in the affirmative.38 And when Senator Gaylord Nelson
suggested adding an amendment preventing the President from going to war, Fulbright
dismissed it.39
Other historians such as George Herring have suggested that the administration had
sought a Congressional resolution to demonstrate its resolve and commitment to the North
Vietnamese. This argument is persuasive. It does appear as though the President hoped that
the threat of even the possible use of force might convince the North Vietnamese to desist
from aiding and supporting the Viet Cong. Assistant Secretary of Defense for International
Security Affairs, John McNaughton instructed the US embassy in Canada to ask the Canadian
intermediary between the North Vietnam and the United States, J. Blair Seaborn to emphasise
to Pham Van Dhong the North Vietnamese Premier, that the "US Congressional resolution
was passed with near unanimity reaffirming... the determination of the U S government.. .to

37 Senate Hearing (Washington, US GPO, 1966) p.l
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continue to oppose firmly DRV efforts to subvert and conquer South Vietnam. "40
Even though he was concerned with his election campaign, Johnson was still troubled
by the inability of the South Vietnamese to achieve his demand of a stable government. His
fears were reflected in his decision to set up a Working Group on the Vietnam war to consider
the course which should be followed by the United States. The Working Group seemed to be
of the opinion that US action should stepped up, mainly to instil some resolve into their weak
Southern Vietnamese allies. The group came up with three possible courses of action. The
United States could either continue with their present policy, (Option A) begin an series of
immediate overt military measures against the North (Option B), or follow a course of
gradual escalation (Option C). Negotiations with the North Vietnamese were noticeably not
one of the options. Under their recommendation the US would launch airstrikes against the
infiltration routes o f the North Vietnamese from Laos, followed by a sustained bombing
campaign against the North.41 The administration hoped that this action would bolster the
struggling ARVN; Assistant Defense Secretary John McNaughton informed the President
that "action is to some extent a substitute for strengthening the government of South
Vietnam."42
But Johnson still remained committed to his principle that the South must establish
stability before the United States considered increasing their aid: whilst he acquiesced in the
proposal to bomb infiltration routes in Laos ( called Operation Barrel Roll), he still refused to

40 The Pentagon Papers (Boston 1971) Telegram from McNaughton to US embassy in Ottowa, 8 August 1964
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agree to any widescale bombing campaign. For the President, there seemed little point in
launching an attack if the South could not repel a possible retaliation from the North. Likening
South Vietnam to a sick person, he stated that he was hesitant to sock neighbour if fever [is]
104. Want to get well first.”43 The South would have to agree to his demands. At a
particularly fractious meeting with Ambassador Taylor on December 1st 1964, he declared
"they do it [establish a workable government]... even if it takes all fifty states and Rockefeller’s
money. They do it or else.”44 The President bluntly informed Ambassador Taylor he would be
given one last chance to help create some order in the chaos o f South Vietnam.
But Taylor faced an uphill task; on December 7th 1964 the military intervened
overthrowing the civilian government of Huong. Taylor's concerns regarding the implications
of this constant political infighting manifested itself in the haranguing which he gave to the
Vietnamese military later that day. Some members of the administration now recognised that
the United States must give some help because the South Vietnamese seemed incapable of
dealing with the Communist threat on their own. This sentiment was reflected in a cable from
Under Secretary o f State George Ball to the American embassy in London which emphasised
that the administration was "deeply concerned about the fragility [of the] internal GVN."
Ball continued ”[it]requires some additional elements that would tend to lift South
Vietnamese morale. ”45
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Escalating the War to Save the South
Clearly members o f Johnson's inner circle began to believe that it was perhaps futile to
keep asking the South Vietnamese to produce a viable government. McGeorge Bundy now
remarked "we wonder whether this requirement is realistic or necessary." 46Worse was yet to
come. In early January, two o f the supposedly elite ARVIN regiments were decimated by the
Viet Cong. According to McNamara, this heavy defeat caused the administration to believe
South Vietnam might be perilously close to collapse and that the United States must take
some action to stave off this defeat.47 Ambassador Taylor now cabled Washington from
Saigon stating " we are going to have help to give Saigon more stability. "48 Even Johnson now
seems to have been convinced that the only way to help Saigon was to attack the north. He
now stated "stable government or no stable government, we'll move strongly. "49
Consequently the widescale aerial campaign which had been proposed back in
November 1964 now began to be viewed seriously as a means of supporting the inept South
Vietnamese. Ironically the demand that the South establish stability, which had once been a
barrier to action, had now become the justification for it. In January 1965, Assistant Secretary
for Far Eastern Affairs, Bill Bundy argued that such a policy might help to improve the
situation in South Vietnam.50 On March 2 1965 Operation Rolling Thunder began. Although
the airstrikes were launched ostensibly in response to North Vietnamese attacks on US bases
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such as the bombing of US barracks at Pleiku in February o f 1965, it seems that this was a
convenient pretext used by the administration to begin an aerial campaign to prop up the
South. McGeorge Bundy, Johnson's NSC adviser later compared Pleiku to a streetcar which
the administration had climbed aboard.51 In a paper on the bombing campaign, Bundy was
more even more explicit about using the attacks at Pleiku as the reason for beginning the
campaign. In a memorandum on Operation Rolling Thunder in early February, he stated that
the attacks "have created an ideal opportunity for the prompt development of sustained
reprisals."52
Operation Rolling Thunder, however, was not the first step on the road to increasing
US ground forces in the region. There was no certainly no agreement within the
administration at this point on the possibility of sending American troops to Vietnam; when
the President asked Ambassador Taylor for his opinion on the introduction of American
forces, the former general who had championed the flexible response theory53was vehemently
opposed to such an idea. According to Taylor, sending US troops would encourage an
already incompetent and ineffective army to withdraw even further and simply allow their
American ally to take up the burden; that US troops "might lead the South Vietnamese to
slacken their efforts." 54
The approval of the aerial campaign had, however, now made it more difficult for the
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President to resist being drawn further into the conflict. If planes were to be sent to the
region, troops would be needed to protect them and it would be difficult to prevent them from
being involved in offensive operations. Almost inevitably, LBJ received a request from
William Westmoreland, the US commander in Vietnam, asking that troops be sent to secure
the US airbase at Da Nang.55 In his memoir, Clark Clifford, Johnson's erstwhile friend, wrote
that the military failed to inform the President that troops would be needed to protect the
airbases.56 Whilst the military did remain conspicuously silent, the President could have
shown a little more foresight when he approved the bombing campaign. Robert McNamara
later admitted that the administration should have considered the longer term consequences
o f the decision to bomb the north.57 It would be easy to conclude that LBJ knew well in
advance that these troops would be used in combat, and that this was part of an elaborate
scheme to stealthily secure America's entry to the war in Vietnam. However, it does seem as
though the President genuinely believed that the troops he was sending would not be involved
in the fighting. Secretary o f State Dean Rusk dispatched a telegram to the embassy in Saigon
stating that the mission of the soldiers was to "provide security for the Da Nang airfield.. .this
is [a] deployment for a limited purpose. "58
Escalating the war to break the North
The President seems to have been swayed by the idea that an aerial campaign would
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convince the North Vietnamese to come to the negotiating table. The North had been willing
to engage in negotiations, but on terms which the United States found unpalatable. These
included the presence o f the National Liberation Front( the political wing o f the Viet Cong) in
the new government. The United States wanted to be able to negotiate on more favourable
terms. Robert McNamara urged his chief to be willing to talk with the North at any time, but
importantly "always on our own terms."59 The US sought the establishment o f a free and
independent South Vietnam with no Communist influence.

Yet, up until 1964 the

administration had no bargaining counter and no means of convincing the North Vietnamese
that they should accept the proposals of the United States. In an Executive Committee
Meeting in November 1964 "there was a consensus that any negotiating outcome under
Option A [staying in Vietnam in an advisory capacity without any pressure on the North]
...was likely to be worse than under Option B [immediate pressure] or Option C [gradual
pressure]"60 Bill Bundy noted in a memorandum in early January 1965 that "under existing
circumstances ..we could not expect to get an outcome that would really secure an
independent SVN."61 Although a widescale aerial campaign was primarily seen by the
President as a means o f bolstering America's weak South Vietnamese allies, bombing might
persuade the North to agree to the terms o f the United States. It could be used in a carrot and
stick fashion; negotiations in return for a cessation o f the bombing. As Maxwell Taylor later
recalled, "the sword must appear to be inescapable to produce a change in the enemy's
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conduct.”62 LBJ clearly hoped that a bombing campaign might help to actually prevent the
conflict in South Vietnam from being prolonged.
The Collapse of South Vietnam
By March of 1965 Johnson was clearly beginning to consider the idea of sending more
US troops; in the top-secret NSAM 328, he authorised the use of US marines already in
Vietnam for active combat if deemed necessary by the Secretary of Defence.63 Equally, it is
difficult to establish whether the President was now genuinely committed to sending troops to
Vietnam. The following month, at Johns Hopkins University he appealed to North Vietnam
to come to the negotiating table and promised large quantities of aid for the region. Nor did he
appear to be particularly pleased about the direction in which US foreign policy was heading.
In April 1965, he lashed out angrily against the military and their recommendations. "Bomb,
bomb, bomb that's all you know," he is reputed to have said to the army chief o f staff Harold K.
Johnson.64 In early May he suspended the bombing o f North Vietnam in the hope that it might
persuade the North Vietnamese to enter negotiations. What these events tend to suggest is
that while Johnson was by now considering escalation, he still hoped to avoid sending more
troops.
Events in South Vietnam in late May and early June of 1965 hardened the president's
attitude towards Vietnam. The situation there was now desperate; nowhere was this more
evident than at Ba Gia where on May 301965, the Viet Cong routed a bedraggled and
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demoralised South Vietnamese army. The effect of this rout on the outlook of the United
States should not be underestimated. A few days later on June 7th, the US Commander in
Vietnam, William Westmoreland sent a cable to the President demanding more troops, citing
as his main reason "the collapse in the ARVN's will to fight.1,65 Robert McNamara paid a quick
visit to the region in mid-July 1965, and came to the same conclusion. In his report to the
President, he argued that unless the United States dispatched troops, the ARVN would be
"faced with a series successive tactical reverses."66 What made this situation even more
desperate was the growing strength of the Viet Cong. Ambassador Maxwell Taylor recalled
that he Viet Cong was marching on with "regimental strength and...a high degree of
professional competence. "67
The situation in South Vietnam was now inextricably linked to the Cold War ideology
o f the Johnson administration. For Johnson and his advisers, South Vietnam had to be saved
to prevent the Communists taking over in Vietnam and spreading their Communist revolution
to the rest of South East Asia. As far back as November 1964 the State Department in a
special intelligence assessment had argued that "the loss of SVN..could be that bad...driving
us to progressive loss of other areas..." 68 In July 1965 (the month in which the crucial
decisions were taken), Secretary of State Dean Rusk, in a cable to the US embassy in Paris
warned of "the consequences [of| US failing or ceasing to assist SVN people resist this
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aggression would be to encourage similar efforts external communist by means [of] war many
other parts of the world.1,69
At meetings, nearly all ofLBJ's advisers warned of the serious consequences of failing
to act. The condition that the South Vietnamese must establish a viable government was now
almost irrelevant. Ambassador Henry Cabot Lodge said at the meeting on Vietnam "there is
no tradition of a national government in Saigon.... we have to do what we think we ought to do
regardless o f what the Saigon government does."70 Sending troops would achieve the
objective of saving the South from an immediate collapse, and in turn preventing the
Communists expanding throughout the continent.
Yet Lyndon Johnson seemed remarkably cautious for a man who was supposedly
determined to become embroiled in a bloody and costly war in Vietnam. At meetings, it was
the President who appeared the most sceptical about increasing the United States'
commitment to South Vietnam, and investigated all possible options. Johnson frequently
asked the in-house dove George Ball for his opinions on the situation, telling him "we have no
mortgage on victory. I think it is desirable to hear you out." He also demanded another
meeting to discuss Ball's alternative proposals and asked all his advisers to consider
alternative courses of action.
One of the other main motives for widening the war was the failure of Operation
Rolling Thunder to achieve its objectives. As explained earlier, bombing was seen by the
President and his advisers as a means to give the Saigon regime time to put its house in order,
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and to convince the North Vietnamese to end their support o f the Viet Cong and accept US
terms. The sustained bombing campaign was a failure in terms o f re-invigorating the South.
The South Vietnamese regime actually entered a new phase of instability and turmoil. In May
1965, the military led by Air Vice Marshal Cao Ky and General Nguyen Thieu overthrew the
civilian government of Phan Huy Quat and established themselves in power. The United
States did not see the return of the military as a positive development. Assistant Secretary Bill
Bundy caustically remarked o f Cao Ky and Nyguyen Thieu "we have reached the bottom of
the barrel. The absolute bottom o f the barrel. " n Ultimately Ky's government would last longer
than any o f its predecessors, but in 1965, the United States government had little faith in this
brash young Turk who openly proclaimed an admiration for Hitler. At a meeting on Vietnam
shortly after the coup, McNamara remarked that Ky’s government would not last long. 72
Another reason for widening the war was that the bombing campaign seemed to be
having no effect on the morale or on the resolve of the North V ietnamese. By May 1965 the
State Department had concluded that the introduction of ground troops might be the one way
to convince them to leave. In a memorandum dated May 20th 1965, the State Department had
concluded that "no amount o f bombing is going to persuade the DRV/VC to abandon their
strategy. They can be persuaded to abandon it only if they are convinced that the trend of
events is against them."73 Clearly a few decisive victories on the American side would
influence their attitude. This new philosophy can be seen in a letter from Secretary of State
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Dean Rusk to Ambassador Taylor. In it he contended that the air campaign had to be
supported by a vigorous land campaign in the South to " create the frame o f mind in Hanoi
which will lead to the decisions which we seek.1,74
The role o f international politics in the Johnson Administration’s Policy in Vietnam
According to former officials such as George Ball, Lyndon Baines Johnson agonised
overthe decision to widen the war.75 Yet however much LBJ was troubled by the prospect of
sending troops to Vietnam, he was even more worried by the thought of remaining idle.
Lyndon Johnson was the leader of the nation which had become a world power during and
after World War Two, and was now at the height o f its power. For Lyndon Johnson, the
reputation and the prestige of the United States as much as its national security was at stake in
Vietnam; withdrawal would seriously damage the reputation of his country both in the eyes of
the United States' enemies as well as its friends. A troubled President was heard to remark by
his Defence Secretary "I think it [withdrawal] would just lose us face in the world and I just
shudder to think what all of, 'em would say " 76 Withdrawal or defeat in Vietnam would make
the United States a paper tiger in the eyes o f the Communists, and would send a signal to
NATO allies that the US commitment to Berlin was based on weak foundations. The Johnson
administration believed that if it failed to help the South Vietnamese, their influence and
dominance in NATO would be severely undermined.

In November 1964, Bill Bundy

suggested the United States, must appear to be strong to her European allies as their
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"willingness to accept continued US primacy in NATO," would be influenced "by the way we
handle South East Asia."77 In this sense the situation in South Vietnam was a test o f the
integrity of the commitment of the US government.
The reaction to the one man who opposed this view indicates just how obsessed
Johnson and his advisers had become about preserving the reputation o f the United States
abroad. George Ball was the only adviser who did not share such pessimistic opinions of the
international repercussions of leaving South Vietnam. Ball who was Under Secretary of State
as well as being the State Department's European Affairs specialist had come to know the
opinions of America's European partners through his extensive dealings with European
leaders such as De Gaulle, Adenauer, and Harold Wilson. He had perceived that they were
surprised at the Johnson Administration's stubbornness and inflexibility over Vietnam. In
meetings he repeatedly argued that it was actually the United States continued presence in
Vietnam which was damaging its reputation amongst American friends and allies. The United
States' European partners thought that the United States was committing a serious error by
remaining in Vietnam. In the debate on the decision to widen the war, Ball boldly stated that
"Western Europeans look at us as if we had got ourselves into an imprudent situation... what
they are concerned about is their own security- troops in Berlin have real meaning "78
Ball also rejected the standard interpretation that abandoning South Vietnam would
make the United States appear weak to the Communists. In several memoranda and meetings
he advised the President not to become further embroiled in Vietnam. In June 1965 he
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ventured to suggest that members o f the administration were seriously overestimating the
impact of a negotiated settlement in Vietnam.79 Yet no-one within the administration or the
cabinet was willing or able to accept his contentions. For the most part his arguments met
with vehement opposition or were treated with scorn. In July of 1965, when Ball pleaded
again for a negotiated withdrawal, the President’s response reflected his fears, as this excerpt
from a meeting shows; "wouldn’t all those countries say that Uncle Sam is a paper tiger... I
gather you are not basically troubled by what the world would say about our pulling out."80
Nor was the President the only one to subscribe to such views. McGeorge Bundy, the
President's NSC adviser, attacked Ball's arguments declaring that "the world, the country and
the UN would have alarming reactions if we got out." 81
After reflecting on the situation over the weekend at Camp David, the President made
his decision. The United States would stand in Vietnam. On July 28 1965 at a White House
press conference he announced that fifty thousand ground troops would be sent to South
Vietnam. But it was a low key speech, with little o f the rhetoric characteristic o f a declaration
o f war. However, American boys would now doing the job which the President had once said
should be done by their Asian counterparts.
The Credibility Gap
In hindsight, Johnson's announcement on July 28th 1965 to the White House press
corps is conspicuous for the President's failure to inform his countrymen that they were
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effectively at war in South Vietnam.82 Nor was this a mere oversight on the part o f a harried
President who had spent the previous week contemplating his administration's future policy in
Vietnam. Lyndon Johnson consciously sought to deceive the American people from April
1965 onwards by telling them that US policy in Vietnam had not changed. In March of 1965,
LBJ had yielded to the demands o f his Commander in South Vietnam and his own Joint Chiefs
of Staff that the US troops stationed in South Vietnam in an advisory role should now be
permitted to engage the enemy.

But there would be no debates, and no formal

announcements. In National Security Action Memorandum 328 written on April 6th 1965
National Security Adviser (NSC) McGeorge Bundy noted that the new US policy o f using US
troops in combat missions should be implemented "as rapidly as practicable, but in ways that
should minimise any appearance of sudden changes in policy." Changing the mission of the
existing troops was clearly a major change in US policy, but the President had no intention of
publicly announcing such a change. Bundy continued to state that the President wanted the
movements to appear as "gradual and wholly consistent with existing policy. "83 In his address
to the Press on July 28th the President failed to place the nation on a war footing, and refused
to mobilise the reserves.
Johnson had been almost obsessed with keeping his decision secret from the press and
the public. When the State Department's Press Officer, Robert McCloskey, committed the
cardinal sin of admitting to the suspicious press pack on June 8th 1965 that the role of US
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forces in South Vietnam had changed, the President was enraged. McCloskey he roared
would be doing his briefing in Africa in the future.84 In the meantime, Johnson's own Press
Secretary George Reedy, besieged by the White House correspondents, was issuing
vehement denials of McCloskey's earlier statement.85 In the weeks leading up to July 28th
1965 some of the President's civilian advisers and his military advisers emphatically stated that
the administration should inform the American public. Defense Secretary Robert McNamara,
who needed the funds to fight the war, was in favour of the President sending a war message to
Congress asking for a massive appropriation. National Security Adviser McGeorge Bundy
reported to the President "Bob [McNamara] is carrying out your orders to plan this whole job
with only $300-400 million...he thinks our posture of candour and responsibility would be
better if we ask for $2 billion. 1 ,8 6 But, on this occasion Johnson ignored the recommendations
o f his advisers. The aim of this section will be to establish why the President failed to take
either Congress or the American people into his confidence when he took the crucial decision
to wage a full scale war in Vietnam.
Lyndon Johnson had no desire to be a war President. The only war which he was really
committed to fighting was his war on Poverty. Vietnam was an irritant, a distraction which
was deflecting the President's attention away from pressing social issues. But LBJ could not
withdraw. As mentioned earlier on, US policymakers from Truman onwards believed that the
Communist threat had to be met and defeated. A declaration of war would though require
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approval from Congress. And Lyndon Johnson knew Congressmen better than any man. He
had worked with them, flattered them and cajoled them as Majority Leader. And he was
aware that many Congressmen were not remotely interested in his domestic programme.
Indeed, some o f them were openly opposed to it. He became convinced that an open
declaration of war would allow these politicians to argue that American soldiers would need
financial support, and that Johnson's reform programme would have to be postponed until the
Communist aggression had been crushed.

The President's fears were reflected in a

conversation with one of his aides; "if we get into this war, I know what's going to happen.
Those damned conservatives are going to sit in Congress and they're going to use this war as a
way of opposing my Great Society legislation. People like [Senator] Stennis and Gross... they
don't want to help the poor and the Negroes...they'll take the war as their weapon...they'll
say... we have this job to do, beating the Communists..."87 And LBJ was determined that he
would surpass even his hero Franklin Roosevelt in the amount of domestic legislation he
would push through Congress. For the President, deceit appeared to be the only way of
preserving his reform programme. The only debate which would be taking place in Congress
that summer would be on civil rights. The President's thinking was reflected in a memorandum
drafted by his NSC adviser McGeorge Bundy, entitled "why not to have a $ 1 billion dollar
appropriation." Bundy argued that a request for extra funds from Congress, " would create
the false impression that we have to have guns, not butter and would help the enemies o f the
President's domestic legislation." “( emphasis added )
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While the President was concerned about the domestic impact o f a declaration of war,
he was equally worried about the global repercussions of sending a war message to Congress.
He was always mindful of the Chinese intervention in Korea in 1950, and he was constantly
fearful o f triggering another Chinese intervention. In July 1965, he frequently asked Earle
Wheeler, the Chairman o f the Joint Chiefs of Staff, if he thought that the expansion of US
forces would provoke Chinese intervention.89 Johnson believed that a public declaration of
war against the North Vietnamese would encourage them to turn to their Chinese allies and
request military support. In a meeting just days before he officially approved General
Westmoreland's request for more troops, the President considered the suggestion that he
should send a war message to Congress, request massive appropriations and declare a state of
emergency. Johnson then explained why he was opposed to such a policy; if the United States
declared war "then North Vietnam would go to its friends - China and Russia - and ask them to
give help. They would be forced into increasing aid. For that reason, I don't want to be
dramatic and cause tension. I think we can get our people to support us without having to be
provocative. ',9° In his memoirs, Walt Rostow ( then chairman of the Policy Planning Staff )
recalled that Johnson had deliberately sought "to avoid a sharp political and psychological
change in course." According to Rostow, the President was convinced this course of action
might prevent the Soviet Union and Communist China from entering the war.91
The President and some of his advisers were also fearful of provoking a nuclear war
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through their actions in South Vietnam. LBJ and his civilian advisers were horrified by the
prospect of using nuclear weapons. Defense Secretary McNamara later recalled that both he
and his chief executive were shocked "at the cavalier way in which the [joint] chiefs and their
associates... referred to and accepted the risk of nuclear weapons.”92 Placing the nation on a
war footing would in the opinion of the President would create an unhealthy war fever among
the American people which might lead US policymakers to contemplate using nuclear
weapons. Dean Rusk, the Secretary of State, declared in an interview after he left office, and
in his memoirs that the Johnson administration did not parade military units or ask film stars to
sell bonds because in a nuclear world ”it was too dangerous for an entire people to grow
angry."93 Consequently, American involvement in South Vietnam would kept as low key as
possible.
Clearly, the President who sought to bring about some of the most wide ranging
reform at home was convinced that the only way of protecting his beloved Great Society was
to mislead Congress and the American people over the depth of US involvement in Vietnam.
Johnson's commitment to domestic reform should not be doubted. In’the long term, however,
Johnson's refusal to conduct a debate in July 1965 would lead to more opposition and would
ultimately undermine his Great Society.
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CHAPTER TWO. LYNDON’S MEN. THE CIVILIAN AND MILITARY
ADVISERS TO THE PRESIDENT
It is easy fo r the President's advisers to be brave, but it is the President who must live with the
decision.
McGeorge Bundy writing to the
President on December 12,1964

In the beginning none o f them were Johnson men. On that bright but snowy morning
in 1961 when a young John F. Kennedy took the oath of office they were all the brightest stars
in the constellation of Kennedy’s New Frontier. Few of them had ever had dealings with the
Vice President. Johnson was so anonymous that the President almost forgot to invite him to
the first cabinet meeting. LBJ's time as Vice President had been an unhappy experience. Bill
Moyers, a Johnson aide recalled that he had been "a man without a purpose, a great horse in a
very small corral." Harry McPherson another Johnson aide, stated that by the summer of
1963 "Johnson had grown heavy and looked miserable."1It was in this frame o f mind that LBJ
suddenly found the Presidency thrust upon him in November of 1963. With the nation
traumatised by the assassination of the President, Johnson would have been inhuman not to
experience feelings of inadequacy. Moreover, LBJ was inexperienced in foreign policy. He
had been involved in some of the major events of the Cold War, but even then he had viewed
foreign policy through the lens of domestic politics. In 1954, when Eisenhower was

1L. Gardner, Pay and Price. Lyndon Johnson and the Wars for Vietnam (Chicago, I. R. Dee, 1995)p.90
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considering a commitment to Indochina, the perceptive Johnson argued against it because he
believed that the American people would not support a war so soon after the conflict in
Korea.2 Even though Senator Richard Russell, Johnson's old friend from the South, urged
Johnson to appoint his own advisers, the President had decided that Kennedy's advisers had to
be retained.

They were Johnson's main link to Kennedy's policies and they could give

legitimacy to the President's policies. Johnson's ties to the media were also limited, and he was
convinced that without the support of the media he could not govern.3 Some o f Kennedy's
men did have close ties to the media. The Bundy brothers and the hard-line anti-Communist
columnist Joe Alsop were on good terms, and Under Secretary of State George Ball had a
good working relationship with James "Scotty "Reston, and Walter Lippmann.
The new President was also extremely impressed by the awesome intellect and
brainpower o f the men who Kennedy had appointed. On the day he became President he
pleaded with Kennedy's advisers to stay, telling them "You're the men I trust. You must stay
with me. I' 11need you. President Kennedy gathered around him extraordinary people...You're
the ablest men I'v e ever known. It's not just that you're President Kennedy's friends, but you
are the best anywhere, and you must stay. "4 Johnson was renowned for his flattery, but on this
occasion it would appear as though there was an element of truth in LB J*s request. In view of
the President's high opinion of the men who surrounded him, it is highly likely that their advice
and recommendations influenced him greatly.
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1A Smart Kid.': McGeorge Bundy in the Johnson White House 1963-1965
The President's National Security Adviser (NSC), McGeorge Bundy was not a man
with long term vision. He was a crisis manager.5 For him, every crisis had a solution. And
Bundy believed that the best solution for the pressing problem in South Vietnam was the use
of force. Force would show the Communists that the United States would not abandon South
Vietnam and would eventually bring the North Vietnamese to the negotiating table. In
addition Bundy believed that the United States national security, and her prestige were at
stake in Vietnam. During the next one and a half years, Bundy's advice would become
increasingly more hawkish, and by the summer of 1965, he was recommending a large
increase in the US commitment to South Vietnam.
In November 1963 the former Harvard professor was not deeply interested or
involved in South Vietnam. He was by inclination more attracted to European issues. When
Bundy had become NSC adviser under Kennedy, he had divided the world up into two
spheres. He would focus on the Western hemisphere, and his deputy Walt Rostow would
concentrate on issues East of Suez.6 However, he had also been shaped by the memory of
Munich in 1938 and he subscribed to the belief that the Communists sought world hegemony.
For Bundy the lesson was clear. Aggressors could not go unpunished. Failure to act would
only encourage the Communists to spread their revolution throughout the world. In 1963,
and 1964 leading US politicians such as Mike Mansfield and international statesmen such as

5 D. Halberstam, The Best and the Brightest (New York, Random House, 1972) passim
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Charles De Gaulle were advocating the neutralisation of Vietnam and the withdrawal of all
outside forces. Bundy was determined that the new President should not be swayed by such
advice. Part o f Bundy's role as NSC adviser was to present opposing sides of the argument,
but as will become evident in this chapter Bundy had become a policy advocate. Very few of
the memoranda he submitted to the President argued against escalating the commitment in
South Vietnam.
When Senator Mike Mansfield (D-Montana) had submitted two memoranda arguing
strongly in favour of the neutralisation o f South Vietnam, the NSC adviser acted swiftly to
prevent such heretical ideas influencing the President. Bundy's response was emphatic.
Neutralisation would inevitably lead to a Communist victory in Vietnam. He wrote to the
President in January 1964, stating "we can still win, even on present ground rules. Any deal to
divide or to neutralise South Vietnam would inevitably mean a new government in Saigon
which would in short order be Communist dominated." (emphasis in original). Bundy decided
to ensure that the President was left in no doubt about the consequences of a Communist
victory.

In the same memorandum he invoked the domino theory, telling him "the

consequences of a Communist dominated South Vietnam are extremely serious...Laos would
almost certainly come under North Vietnamese domination, Cambodia would accept Chinese
domination, Thailand would become very shaky...a truly neutral Southeast Asia is very
unlikely from such a sequence of events, "(emphasis in original).7 Although LBJ had made his

7 Memoranda o f the Special Assistant to the President 1963-1966. McGeorge Bundy (University Publications of
America, Frederick, Maryland, 1985) memo to the President January 81964
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commitment to South Vietnam clear from the day when he assumed office, the Harvard dean
wanted to reinforce his commitment. In March o f 1964 he sent a memorandum to Johnson
entitled "Why is South Vietnam important to us." He informed the President that it was an
important part o f Southeast Asia, and that the United States had a commitment in honor and
national prestige. Bundy was concerned that the dire situation in South Vietnam might
weaken the new President's resolve. He told the President "this is no time to quit, and it is no
time for discouragement. "8 The Senator from Montana continued to pressure the President to
hold talks with the North Vietnamese throughout 1964 and 1965. Bundy continued to
vehemently refute Mansfield's arguments. In December 1964 he wrote to the President
stating "we do not see how we can have useful exploratory talks with the Chinese... everything
we know about Peking suggests there is no interest in a serious conversation. "9
Bundy's position on the US role in South Vietnam was becoming more evident during
1964. As mentioned earlier the NSC adviser believed strongly in the use of force. During the
Cuban missile crisis Bundy had favoured an attack on the Soviet sites in Cuba, and in the
Dominican crisis of 1965 it was Bundy who advocated sending the US marines to the island.
Most importantly, the United States would be using force. Not some second rate country like
France who had no idea how to deploy force effectively. And the Americans in Bundy's
opinion had the best trained forces and the best technology. There was little doubt in Bundy's
mind that the mere threat of US action would Overwhelm its opponents. InMay 1964,he

8 Memoranda o f the Special Assistant to the President 1963-1966. McGeorge Bundy (University Publications of
America, Frederick, Maryland, 1985) memo to the President March 141964
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urged the President to launch a selected and graduated military campaign against the North
Vietnamese. Bundy had clearly reached the conclusion that the covert operations under the
aegis of the CIA were having a minimal impact on the situation. He suggested that "the
deployments be on a very large scale from the beginning... a pound o f threat is worth a pound
o f action."10 By August the NSC adviser was contemplating the use of US forces in the region.
Bundy's confidence in the superiority of American soldiers resonated throughout the
memorandum he sent to the President. He confidently predicted that the presence of two
brigades would "be good medicine everywhere." 11
The President who was campaigning as a man of moderation in contrast to the trigger
happy Goldwater had refused to act upon his adviser's suggestions. In January 1965, worried
by the inability of the South Vietnamese to form a stable government, Bundy sent the
President one of his most forceful memoranda. In it he declared that he and Defense Secretary
Robert S. McNamara were "pretty well convinced that our current policy can lead only to
disastrous defeat." Bundy was openly critical of the advisory role o f the United States in
Vietnam. He warned the President that "this essentially passive role "would lead to eventual
defeat and the withdrawal of US forces.12 The language had been carefully chosen to make an
impact on the President. The use of the words "passive" and "defeat," would naturally
provoke Lyndon Johnson who despised both inactivity and defeat. Bundy offered the
President two options. The United States could either use the military power at its disposal or

10 Memoranda o f the Special Assitantto the President for National Security Affairs. 1963-1966. McGeorge Bundy
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negotiate. Bundy recommended the use of military power. The President’s NSC adviser had
been dispensing his advice in his typically cold, calculating and detached manner up to this
point. In February he paid a visit to South Vietnam which removed any doubts he might have
had and made his commitment to escalation almost irreversible.
During McGeorge Bundy’s trip to South Vietnam, the Viet Cong launched a mortar
attack on the US barracks at Pleiku. It was not the first such attack. The VC had attacked the
airbase at Bien Hoa and the Brinks hotel in 1964 which enraged Maxwell Taylor, the US
ambassador to South Vietnam. This time Bundy was in the country when the attack occurred.
The attack reportedly infuriated Bundy. Moreover the sight of the wounded US troops upset
the usually detached NSC adviser. His response was swift. On a secure telephone line to
Washington, he recommended to Deputy Secretary Vance that the US should carry out a
retaliatory raid.13 Jim Thomson who worked for Bundy on the National Security Council later
recalled th a t" Mac the dispassionate man became, for a while ardent. ”14
After Pleiku, Bundy worked vigorously to secure the escalation of the US
commitment in Vietnam. Those who opposed him were scythed down in Bundy's incisive and
ruthless way. George Ball constantly reminded his colleagues of the French experience in
Indochina in 1954. The National Security Adviser attacked such opinions. He believed that
the United States was infinitely superior to the French. The French had failed in Bundy's
opinion because they were weak and incompetent. The French he caustically remarked ’’were
never united or constant in their prosecution of the war." They were a "colonial power out of

13 FRUS. Vietnam. January-June 1965 Vol 1 (Washington, US GPO,1996) memo o f White House meeting by Cyrus
Vance 7 February 1965
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touch with Vietnamese nationalism." By contrast, the United States was "responding to the
call of a people under Communist assault." Moreover, unlike the French the United States
was in Bundy's opinion far more united and prepared for a campaign in Vietnam.15 Bundy
worked assiduously to destroy Ball's arguments. In early July of 1965 when Ball submitted a
memorandum to the President suggesting withdrawal, Bundy attached a covering note where
he stated "my hunch is that you will want to listen hard to George Ball and then reject his
proposal."16
For McGeorge Bundy, America's national security and its prestige were at stake in
Vietnam. In emotive and forceful language in his report on Vietnam to the President in
February 1965, he declared that the United States reputation, and its global influence were on
the line in Vietnam.17 When George Ball argued in favour of a US withdrawal and negotiations
during the crucial meetings in July 1965, Bundy opposed him vigorously. In the July
meetings, Bundy calmly, but authoritatively stated that the abandonment o f Vietnam would
be little short of a disaster. Bundy declared that "He would rather maintain our present
commitment and waffle through than withdraw."18 He sarcastically asked the Under
Secretary, "what are you going to say to the world about the people whom you have said you
would never desert?"Bundy's intervention was telling. Johnson who had previously been
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listening hard to Ball’ s suggestions changed the subject and began to discuss the need for
favourable press coverage.19
In that meeting on July 21 1965, Bundy remarked that it was the function of his staff to
put forward both sides of an argument. Nor should Bundy's position within the White House
be underestimated. His office was in the White House basement which gave him regular
access to the President, and he controlled the flow of information to the President. Yet as his
response to George Ball's opposition shows, at no time did Bundy expose the President to the
different opinions within his government. Jim Thomson who worked for Bundy on the NSC
staff recorded that he tolerated and encouraged dissent. If he did, he certainly did not share it
with the President. George Ball had sent his first memorandum to Bundy in October of 1964.
The memorandum did not reach the President. Ball passed the document to the young
Presidential aide, Bill Moyers who ensured that the President saw it. The President finally saw
Ball's arguments in February 1965 when he had already authorised Operation Rolling
Thunder.20
There is evidence that the confident Bundy even had personal doubts about Vietnam.
In a memo of a meeting with the President on June 1Oth 1965, Bundy scribbled a personal note
which asked "how effective our people are in combat - this really is a serious matter."21 Yet
again there is no evidence which shows that he raised these doubts with the President; and
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these were precisely the types of question which the President needed to hear from his NSC
adviser. When Defense Secretary McNamara recommended a large increase in the US troop
contingent in Vietnam, the NSC adviser sent him a memorandum which questioned some o f
his ideas. Bundy in his forthright manner told his colleague "my first reaction is that this
programme is rash to the point of folly." He questioned McNamara's belief that the VC would
fight a conventional war, and then suggested that the objectives of the Secretary of Defense
were unclear.22The memorandum was addressed to the Secretary of Defense, and according
to Jim Thomson, Bundy never passed it on to the President.23 The NSC adviser was too
committed to intervention in Vietnam. Johnson had been deprived of important arguments
and opinions by his NSC adviser.
Bundy had been one of the men closest to Kennedy. JFK admired his incisiveness, and
his sharp analytical mind. Lyndon Johnson was not so enamoured with his new NSC adviser,
however. Johnson who both loathed and respected intellectuals, was suspicious of Bundy.
Johnson thought him to be both superior and condescending.24 Initially their relationship was
fraught with tension. Bundy later admitted that the first few months were a stressful time. But
the Harvard professor was no Kennedy partisan in the mould of Arthur M. Schlesinger or
Theodore Sorensen. Bundy’s loyalty was to the Presidency. He represented generations of
service to the Presidency. His father Harvey Bundy had worked for former Secretary o f State
Henry L. Stimson, and Bundy himself had helped Stimson write his memoirs. Bundy had been
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trained to serve. And so he worked hard to prove his loyalty to the new President. Shortly after
Kennedy's death, he wrote an article entitled, 'the Presidency and the Peace1 in which he
argued that he could serve both John F. Kennedy and Lyndon Johnson. When Arthur M.
Schlesinger continued to snipe at the President, Bundy berated him in a letter, telling him
"there is every reason of purpose and policy for those who loved President Kennedy to give
our full support to President Johnson. "25 Sensing a hostility towards the new President on his
own National Security Staff, Bundy called a meeting, and reprimanded his staff.26 Although
his relationship with the President was never close, it had improved by 1964 and Johnson had
come to trust and rely on his National Security Adviser. Talking to Bundy was like talking to
Kennedy he once said. And Bundy's advice was by late 1965 beginning to influence the
President. During the debate on the multi-lateral force (MLF) Bundy's vigorous opposition to
the MLF convinced the President to abandon the project.27And on the issue of Vietnam, his
advice was having a major impact on the President. Johnson had refused to wage a bombing
campaign against the North Vietnamese, much to the dismay of Ambassador Maxwell Taylor.
But when Bundy visited Pleiku and recommended air strikes, the President concurred in such
a decision with surprising promptness, according to Maxwell Taylor. Vice President Hubert
Humphrey later recalled that Bundy's recommendations in February 1965 carried great
weight with the President. He wrote " it may be that what Bundy cabled, moved Johnson more
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than would have been normal Bundy was an impressive man."28 By July 1965, Bundy's star
was on the rise in the White House, and his advice was clearly having a significant impact on
the President.

28 D. Barrett, quoting H. Humphrey in Uncertain Warriors. Lyndon Johnson and his advisers (Kansas, University of
Kansas Press, 1993) p. 17

47

’ Hardworking and loyal as a beaglef : Secretary o f State Dean Rusk.
Dean Rusk was a believer in the existence of a Communist threat. Rusk had an almost
Dulles-like conception o f the world. There were the evil forces of tyranny seeking to spread
their revolution to every part of the globe, and there were the forces of righteousness who
were willing to fight them to ensure the future of democracy. It was a view which Rusk had
held since his days in the Truman administration. Rusk had been Assistant Secretary o f State
for Far Eastern Affairs in the Korean war. The Korean war had shaped his outlook in foreign
affairs. Rusk had left government in 1953 firmly convinced in the existence of a monolithic
Communist bloc which sought world hegemony. His fiery speeches which referred to a
godless, evil country seeking to dominate the world reflected his convictions. It was not
surprising that Dean Rusk was one of the few individuals in the Truman administration who
John Foster Dulles, had not roundly condemned in the 1952 election campaign. Indeed it had
been Dulles who had recommended Rusk for the position of President of the Rockefeller
Foundation in 1953.29 When Johnson became President, he acquired a Secretary o f State
whose convictions were unshakeable. Whilst Rusk was by nature a cautious individual, he
never expressed any doubts to the President about the US position in Vietnam.
Rusk believed that his advice to the President was not a topic for discussion.
Consequently he rarely wrote memoranda to the President, and he reserved his counsel for
private meetings with the President. Rusk's advice was invariably the same on each occasion
which he met with the President. The Communists were trying to spread their revolution to all
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parts o f the globe, and the United States was the only nation equipped to face down this threat.
In his first memorandum to the President he sought to quash any talk o f the neutralisation of
Vietnam. Neutralisation, he wrote would lead to the creation of a regime which "would be
prey to a Communist takeover. "30 Vietnam represented an opportunity for the United States
to thwart the activities of the Communists. In February 1964 he wrote to Defense Secretary
McNamara, that the United States "must demonstrate to both the Communist and nonCommunist worlds that the wars of national liberation formula now being pushed by so
actively by the Communists will not succeed. "31
Rusk was a careful man and was not as eager as some of his colleagues to embark upon
a full scale attack against the Viet Cong and North Vietnamese. At a National Security
Council meeting in May 1964 Rusk argued that if the administration became more deeply
involved in Vietnam it would be, " open to accusations of colonialism."32 The Secretary later
wrote that the United States should continue in its advisory capacity in South Vietnam. When
NSC adviser and Defence Secretary McNamara pressured the President to escalate the
commitment in Vietnam, Rusk was skeptical about becoming more involved in the murky
waters of Vietnam. McGeorge Bundy concluded his memorandum of January 27 1965 by
stating that "Dean Rusk does not agree with us. He does not quarrel with our assertion that
things are going badly and that the situation is unraveling...what he does say is that the
consequences of both escalation and withdrawal are so bad that we simply must find

30 FRUS. Vietnam 1964 (Washington, US GPO, 1996)p.l0 Memo from Rusk to LBJ January 8 1964
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a way of making our present policy work.1,33 Rusk was also noticeably absent when LB J made
the decision to launch an aerial campaign against North Vietnam. But the Secretary o f State
did not dissent for long. His perception of world politics left him little choice but to agree with
his colleagues and support the escalation of the US commitment..
In February 1965, just after the President had authorised the retaliatory strikes against
the North Vietnamese, Rusk sent the President one o f his rare memoranda. In it Rusk
repeatedly emphasised his fear of the consequences of a Communist victory in South
Vietnam. The concerned Secretary informed the President that he was "convinced that it
would be disastrous for the United States and the free world to permit Southeast Asia to be
overrrun by the Communist North. " He then went further than most of his civilian colleagues
by recommending that the President send US ground troops to the region. There could be no
doubts about his position now.He now recommended to the President that he dispatch one
battalion to the Da Nang airbase, and allow US forces to wage an aerial campaign against the e
enemy.34 Most of Lyndon Johnson's advisers knew that he did not like this war in Asia. He had
told them that he wanted to get out, but was unsure how to do so. Rusk whose understanding
of world politics was still set in 1950, scoffed at the idea o f a deal with the Communists. His
opposition to such a plan was empahatic; he maintained that "negotiations as a lever for the
abandonment of Southeast Asia to the Communist North cannot be accepted."35

33 Memoranda o f the Special Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs 1963-1966. McGeorge Bundy
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Moreover, the Secretary of State firmly believed that the United States had made a
pledge to the South Vietnamese in 1954. The word o f the United States had been given. Even
though it might be a dubious commitment the United States must fulfil its pledges. Rusk
warned the President that one failure would embolden the Communists and encourage them
to spread their revolution throughout the world. And if the South Vietnamese were failing,
the United States would have to enter the fray. In July of 1965, Rusk used this argument to
justify his recommendation to the President to increase the amount of US troops serving in
South Vietnam. He told the President" there can be no serious debate about the fact that we
have a commitment to assist the South Vietnamese to resist aggression from the North."36
Having reminded the President of US obligations, he then warned him o f the dire
consequences of failing to help the South Vietnamese;" the integrity of the US commitment is
the principal pillar throughout the world. If that pillar becomes unreliable, the Communist
world would draw conclusions that would lead to our ruin."37 Like his other cabinet
colleagues Rusk then urged the President to increase the US forces in South Vietnam.
Dean Rusk's advice to his chief executive was also heavily shaped by his experiences
as Assistant Secretary o f State for Far Eastern Affairs during the Korean War. In Rusk's
opinion the US police action against the Communists had been a success. Admittedly there
had been the small matter of the tactical reverses suffered by MacArthur, but the police action
had saved South Korea from falling to the Communists, and had shown them that they would

36 FRUS. Vietnam June-December 1965 (Washington, US GPO 1996) p. 104
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face American might wherever they tried to spread their revolution. And initially, the US
prospects there had looked extremely gloomy. Consequently, Rusk was confident that South
Vietnam could be rescued from the clutches o f the Communists. It might require more effort,
but in no circumstances could the United States withdraw. When his Under Secretary George
Ball suggested that the United States did not have a commitment to the South Vietnamese
because there was effectively no government, Rusk invoked Korea to justify the US role in
Vietnam, and tersely told Ball "don't give me that stuff..." He lectured Ball "you don't
understand that at the time of the Korea that we had had to go out and get Syngman Rhee [the
South Korean leader] out of the bush where he was hiding." The Secretary continued that
" we're going to get some breaks and this thing [the US commitment to South Vietnam] is
going to work."38(emphasis added)
Lyndon Johnson had also inherited a Secretary of State who was occasionally overly
deferential to the recommendations of the Secretary of Defence and the Joint Chiefs of Staff
Yet again Rusk's attitude towards to the Defence Department was shaped by his experiences
as the Assistant Secretary of State. He had witnessed the feud between the Secretary of State
Dean Acheson and Secretary o f Defence Louis Johnson under Truman. There would be no
such battles under Dean Rusk. He was determined to create a strong working relationship
with Robert S. McNamara. Some of his subordinates in the State Department, including
Under Secretary Ball felt that the relationship between Rusk and the Defence Secretary was

38 D. Di Leo, George Ball, Vietnam and the Rethinking o f Containment (Chapel Hill, University o f North Carolina
Press, 1991) p. 101

52

perhaps a little too close, too harmonious. In their opinion, Rusk was deferring too readily to
the opinions of the military and the Defense Secretary.39 Rusk himself had been a former
military officer in the Far Eastern theatre in World War II, and had great respect for the
judgements o f the US armed forces. He certainly did not ask them any searching questions
during the period in question. In April 1965, in a telegram to the US ammbassador to Saigon,
Maxwell Taylor, Rusk noted that the " JCS...consider it necessary to reinforce GVN ground
forces with about twenty battalion equivalents...since these forces cannot be raised by the
GVN they must inevitably come from US sources..." This was a significant new request, but
the Secretary of State did not even question the assumptions of the armed forces. Instead, he
he informed the US ambassador that he would be readily acquiescing in the demands of the
armed forces.40 Rusk’s view o f the world and his deeprooted respect for the military caused
him to urge the President to widen the US commitment to the region.
Dean Rusk's advice was perhaps the most important because of his position in the
Johnson White House. Like LBJ, Rusk had felt out of place in the Kennedy administration.
He had felt ill at ease in this world of cocktail parties and East Coast intellectuals. Most of all
he had despised Kennedy's freewheeling style in government. There were even rumours that
Kennedy planned to replace Rusk after the 1964 election. When Lyndon Johnson became
President in November 1963, Rusk suddenly became an important figure. LBJ liked and
respected Dean Rusk. He and the Secretary of State had already struck up a good working
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relationship during Johnson's years in the wilderness of the Vice Presidency. Rusk had
assigned the Vice President a Foreign Service Officer so that he would receive briefings on
foreign affairs. LBJ also shared Rusk’s hatred o f the Kennedy management style.41 One o f his
first acts was to fire the Assistant Secretary o f State for Far Eastern Affairs, Roger Hilsman,
who Rusk particularly disliked because of his disdain for bureaucratic channels and the chain
o f command. Moreover, the two men shared a common background which brought them
closer together. Rusk had risen from an extremely humble background in Cherokee County
Georgia, and the President also came from a modest background in Texas. Two southerners
in this world of East Coast intellectuals, they formed an extremely close personal
friendship.Rusk recalled that, " we often reminisced about our southern upbringings and our
rural pasts. "42 The President often stated," I love that Dean." Rusk himself admitted th a t" our
official relationship was reinforced by personal friendship."43 But the President had
tremendous respect for the Secretary's credentials. Dean Rusk had won a Rhodes Scholarship
to Oxford as a young man. And Lyndon Johnson who had been educated at San Marcos State
Teachers college in Texas was impressed by such a qualification. Even more importantly, the
Secretary was loyal to the President. There would be no leaks and no criticism of the
President from Dean Rusk. And LBJ prized loyalty. Rusk was undoubtedly the man who was
closest to the President, and his advice had perhaps the greatest impact on the President. Walt
Rosto w who would later succeed McGeorge Bundy as the President's National Security
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Adviser, stated in his memoirs that Rusk was " primus inter pares."44 When Rusk suggested
that US troops be sent to the Da Nang airbase in late February 1965, Johnson agreed to send
US troops only days later. Bill Bundy, the Assistant Secretary for Far Eastern Affairs under
Johnson later claimed that that Rusk’s recommendations in June and July 1965 that the United
States must honor its commitment and dispatch troops to the region carried the most weight
with the President.45
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* The Man from Ford with the Stacomb.’ : Secretary of Defence Robert S.
McNamara
In the early months of the Johnson administration Robert S. McNamara was the
individual in the public mind most closely associated with the Vietnam war. The press had re
named it McNamara's war. It was not a misnomer. The brilliant Secretary o f Defence was the
cabinet official most heavily involved in the decision making process and the most forceful
advocate of the US role in South Vietnam. McNamara shared his colleagues belief in the
existence of a Communist threat. For McNamara the Communist insurgency in South
Vietnam, was part of a wider plot o f the Chinese Communists to overrun the whole o f
Southeast Asia and ultimately threaten the security of the United States. The Defence
Secretary was also a believer in the superiority of American technology; his years at the Ford
Motor Company had left him with an abiding belief in the effectiveness o f American
technology. McNamara was also a statistician by training. T he war could be viewed in terms
of numbers and figures. If the North Vietnamese inflicted heavy losses on the South more
troops could be sent in to counter the increased size of the North Vietnamese forces.
Together these three beliefs caused the Secretary of Defence to support the growing US
commitment to South Vietnam and to strongly recommend a massive escalation of the war
throughout 1965. Bundy have had his own personal doubts. McNamara did not have any in
1965. Throughout the period he deployed all the figures and arguments he possessed to
persuade the President to widen the war.
In late 1963 and throughout 1964 there was talk of neutralisation in government
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circles, and the Secretary o f Defence acted quickly to quash it. Mike Mansfield's
memorandum of January 1964 arguing for a negotiated settlement in Vietnam and
neutralisation produced a visceral reaction from McNamara. Neutralisation in McNamara's
world would lead to the creation of a Communist controlled state. He warned the President
that the neutralisation of South Vietnam would inevitably lead to the formation o f a
government run by Communists.46 In March of 1964 he contemptuously dismissed the plan
for neutralisation put forward by French President Charles De Gaulle. De Gaulle's ideas, he
warned, would allow the Communists to entrench themselves in power in South Vietnam.47
The Secretary of Defence clearly found such an idea unpalatable. He was convinced that
conceding South Vietnam to the Communists would only encourage them to continue their
activities in Asia. His memorandum of January 1964 reflected his fears. In it he declared that
"the consequences of a Communist dominated Vietnam are extremely serious for the rest of
Southeast Asia and the US position in the rest o f Asia... "48
Throughout the period, the Defense Secretary vigorously fought any suggestions for
the withdrawal of US forces. Once he had made a decision he hated to be contradicted or
challenged. He had examined the facts and the figures, and was convinced of the rightness of
his course. Dissent tended to incur McNamara's wrath. When George Ball sent McNamara a
copy o f his first memorandum which questioned the presence and the role o f the United States
in South Vietnam, the Defense Secretary was apoplectic. Ball recalled that he " was
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absolutely horrified and treated the memorandum like a poisonous snake.” McNamara was
clearly infuriated by such opposition to a policy which he had given his seal of approval to.Ball
in his opinion was "out of line."49 During the July meetings when the administration was
considering the massive increase in US forces, McNamara was clearly disturbed by Ball's
suggestion that the United States should cut its losses and leave Vietnam. At the July meeting
McNamara argued that the Under Secretary was seriously underestimating the effect of
withdrawal from Vietnam. He strongly supported the position of the Secretary of State.50
McNamara was also an extremely active man by nature, a trait which he shared with
the President. This proclivity for action manifested itself in the Defense Secretary's eagerness
for action in South Vietnam. In December 1963, Johnson who was becoming aware of the
mess which he had inherited from Kennedy sent the widely admired McNamara on a fact
finding mission to South Vietnam. McNamara had noticed that the South Vietnamese seemed
incapable of waging war effectively. The energetic Defense Secretary immediately began to
consider some form of action to bolster the South Vietnamese. He suggested to the President
that the administration should be "preparing for more forceful moves if the situation does not
show early early signs of improvement."51 In March 1964 McNamara's position on Vietnam
was becoming increasingly hawkish.

He recommended that planning for a graduated

bombing campaign against the NorthVietnamese inwhichUS forces would participate
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should begin. Admittedly the Secretary did express his opposition to the idea that US ground
troops should be sent to South Vietnam. As mentioned earlier, he believed that it would have
a damaging psychological effect on the South Vietnamese war effort because it would
contradict the statements of the US government that the South Vietnamese were winning the
war.
The incompetence o f the South Vietnamese army and government intensified the
Secretary's fears. By January 1965, he was urging the President to change course in Vietnam
and embark upon a sustained bombing campaign. The Secretary acknowledged that such a
campaign would have little military impact. It was designed to help boost the morale o f the
South Vietnamese. When the air campaign failed to have any effect on either the South
Vietnamese or the North Vietnamese, McNamara's thoughts began to drift towards deeper
involvement. At a meeting of the National Security Council on April 1 1965, he " agreed that
we could not force the Viet Cong and the North Vietnamese to change their policy through the
present program alone.”52 One of the President's most important advisers had now signed on
to a plan to send troops to South Vietnam. In April 1965 only days after LBJ had agreed to
change the mission of the marines in South Vietnam, McNamara met with the Joint Chiefs of
Staff and General Westmoreland to discuss their demands for more troops. The Secretary
yielded to almost all their demands. At the meeting, McNamara argued that the introduction
of US troops might have an impact on the war against the Viet Cong.53 He returned to
Washington, and sent a memorandum to the President, telling him that neither he nor any of
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his military advisers "expects the DRV/VC to capitulate."54 LBTs advisers all suggested that
82,000 troops be sent to South Vietnam.
In late June LBJ asked o f all o f his advisers for their opinions and recommendations.
McNamara's memorandum advocated a massive increase in the number of US forces serving
in South Vietnam, and mining the North Vietnamese harbours. The Secretary of Defense
argued that the war was clearly becoming a conventional war, and that in such a situation, US
forces would have few difficulties in locating and than fighting the enemy. In July 1965 he
paid a visit to Vietnam to establish General Westmoreland's requirements35 McNamara did
not ask the US Commander if his strategy would work or if US troops could fight in the jungle
effectively.
On his return, he sent a memorandum to the President outlining his recommendations.
The memorandum was carefully phrased to give the President the impression that he had little
choice but to escalate the war. McNamara gave the President three options in Vietnam. The
President could either withdraw, continue in Vietnam at existing levels or escalate the war
against the Viet Cong.56 Yet his analysis of the first two options effectively left the President
with only one option. Withdrawal, he argued would be "very damaging" to the United States',
" future effectiveness on the world scene." Staying in South Vietnam in an advisory role
would not solve any of the problems which now faced the US President. The situation in
Vietnam was now desperate, and Westmoreland would ask for more troops soon. By then it
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might be too late for US troops to have an impact on the war, and one of the dominoes would
have fallen.57 Bill Moyers, Johnson's young aide, later stated the Secretary's analysis
"presumed rejection,"of the first two options.58 The Defense Secretary then urged the
President to send a further thirty four battalions to the region. The Secretary o f Defense was
convinced that American firepower would produce the results the adminstration sought. His
plan he confidently stated stood " a good chance of achieving an acceptable outcome within a
reasonable time in Vietnam. "59
Robert McNamara's recommendations had added force because of the close
relationship he enjoyed with the President. In the early years of the Johnson administration
McNamara was ascendant. McNamara was renowned in government circles and in the press
for his prodigious memory and his powerful intellect. If Bob McNamara was directing a war,
it could not possibly go wrong. The feet that McNamara had never failed in any of his jobs
must certainly have made an impression on the President. In any case, Lyndon Johnson had
been in awe of him from his very first cabinet meeting in 1961. After watching all these bright
men sitting round the cabinet table, he had rushed back to tell his mentor Sam Rayburn about
them, especially "the man from Ford with the stacomb." Later on, when Johnson had lost
confidence in his Secretary o f Defence, he would become just th e," man who had headed Ford
for a week. "60But in 1964 and 1965, Johnson was enamoured with his Defense Secretary.
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According to Jack Valenti, Johnson's aide, the President trusted McNamara implicitly.61
Valenti later stated that LBJ, thought "that McNamara was divinely inspired at times because
his mind had computer-like serenity."62 Indeed, the President was so in awe o f McNamara's
abilities that he even asked him to be his running mate in the 1964 election. McNamara was
the cabinet official invited the most to spend weekends at Camp David with the President.
Moreover McNamara was loyal to Johnson. He never cultivated relations on Capitol Hill and
relied on the President to protect him. Johnson was obsessed that all his advisers were "in bed
with the Kennedys." McNamara was identified with the Kennedy clan, but he showed a fierce
commitment to the President. At meetings McNamara was also extremely impressive. He
overwhelmed his colleagues with his mastery of facts, details and figures. And he used these
figures extremely skilfully to support his arguments. George Ball always feared McNamara
because his use of ratios and percentages would make Ball's own arguments appear to be
superficial and implausible.

Indeed Ball later came to believe that McNamara had

manufactured these details to support his arguments. McNamara's demeanour at these
meetings gave more credibility to his arguments. The Secretary of Defence would not make
his statements with the quiet assurance which was so characteristic of Dean Rusk. He would
put his case across with force and would unleash a torrent of arguments and numbers to
undermine his opponents. An argument put foward by Bob McNamara was expressed with
such authority, such conviction, such clarity that it was almost impossible not to be swayed by
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it.

Considering that Johnson viewed McNamara's recommendations in an extremely

uncritical light, it is clear that McNamara's opinion was clearly valued by the President and
persuaded him to launch an aerial campaign and to send troops to South Vietnam.
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f No liberal egghead intellectual *: Under Secretary of State George Ball
George Ball was the one individual who consistently opposed the plans to escalate the
war in Vietnam. Ball was a savvy lawyer, with a sharp iconoclastic mind. Although he was
Under Secretary of State and a Europeanist by inclination, Vietnam did not escape his
attention. In the 1950s Ball had been a legal counsel to the French government and had
witnessed the desperate efforts o f the French to maintain its hold on its colony of Indochina.
Ball had seen how the war had sapped French morale and provoked domestic criticism. The
Under Secretary remained extremely wary of any attempts to become further involved and
throughout the period fought against the US commitment to Vietnam. He was vehemently
opposed both to the aerial campaign and the decision to send US ground forces to the region.
In June o f 1965 he audaciously suggested that the United States should withdraw its support
and seek a negotiated settlement. Every possible argument was deployed to persuade
President Johnson that Vietnam was a death trap for the United States.

Some of his

arguments bordered on heresy. Ball dismissed the contention that Vietnam was essential to
US national security, and rejected the domino theory in Southeast Asia. He also suggested
that the United States armed forces would not be successful in fighting a guerilla war in South
Vietnam Knowing that Johnson's priorities lay in domestic policy, he argued that mounting
casualties in South Vietnam would arouse domestic opposition and undermine the President.
The Under Secretary also tried to convince LBJ and his advisers that America's allies did not
think highly ofthe United States for becoming involved in Vietnam.
The Under Secretary was extremely skeptical about the bombing campaign which
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Bundy, Rusk, Taylor and McNamara seemed to be advocating so enthusiastically. A former
member o f the Strategic Bombing Command in World War

n, he believed that bombing

actually tended to increase the morale o f the enemy.63A war game played by the Joint Chiefs of
Staff in April 1964 appeared to support his thesis. In May 1964, clearly worried about the
direction of US policy in Vietnam, he asked his superior Dean Rusk “Why are we
contemplating an air action against the North in the face of a recently played war game which
demonstrated the ineffectiveness of such a tactic?"64 Ball's question went unheard and
unanswered.
In 1965 most policymakers still accepted the domino theory unquestioningly. But not
George Ball. He once wrote that "the great captains of history drew their lessons from
complex chess, not simple dominoes."65 Bundy, Rusk, McNamara and the Joint Chiefs had in
Ball's opinion rushed headlong into a course of action without any discussion of the
assumptions which were guiding US foreign policy. He was not convinced that the loss of
South Vietnam would lead to the fall of the rest o f Southeast Asia. Ball did not even view the
war in Vietnam as part of an international conspiracy. It was the legacy of years o f domination
by foreign countries. From May 1964 to July 1965, Ball raised searching questions about the
importance of South Vietnam to the United States and suggested that the United States reach
a compromise settlement and withdraw. In an undated memorandum to the President in July
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1965 he suggested that "we have tended to exaggerate the losses involved in a compromise
settlement in South Vietnam." According to Ball, US influence would not decline if South
Vietnam were to fall. He noted that " a compromise settlement in South Vietnam should not
have a major impact on the credibility of our commitments around the world. ”66
In Bundy's and McNamara's opinion, America had the best trained, and best equipped
forces in the world. It was inconceivable in their minds that the United States might actually
lose in Vietnam. Remembering the experiences of the French in the 1950s who had been
backed by the United States, Ball was not so sure. The Vietnamese were an enemy with a
cause, and no amount of guns, men and helicopters could persuade them to end the
insurgency. In a private memorandum to Dean Rusk in May 1964, he informed him that "the
history o f the Viet Cong has been that of carrying on underground when necessary... they did
not give up a plan that has now been in existence for more than two decades..."67 The Under
Secretary was also extremely uncertain that the Viet Cong would be accomodating enough to
wage a conventional war against the US armed forces. At the important July meetings in 1965,
he pointedly asked the Chairman of Joint Chiefs of Staff Earle Wheeler "isn't it possible that
the VC will do what they did against the French - stay away from confrontation and not
accomodate us ? M68 While the rest of Johnson's advisers were anticipating US victories in the
field, George Ball was contemplating the type o f terrain which US troops would have fight on,
and if they could achieve the successes predicted by the confident Bundy and Rusk. In April
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1965 when Johnson was beginning to consider the possibility o f sending troops to South
Vietnam, Ball warned the President that summer in Vietnam was the rainy season and
suggested that the Viet Cong would prosper since they were not reliant on motor transport in
the way that the Americans and South Vietnamese were.69 In June 1965, seeing that the
escalation was gaining momentum, the Under Secretary urged LBJ not to make an open
ended commitment to South Vietnam. They needed to have evidence that American troops
would "not bog down in the jungles and rice paddies..." He continued to emphasise this point;
in a later memorandum the Under Secretary told the President "we would run the grave risk of
bogging down an indeterminate number o f American troops in a protracted and bloody
conflict. "70 And once US forces were committed, Ball noted it would be extremely difficult for
the United States to extricate itself from the imbroglio in South Vietnam. Ball warned the
President "the more forces we deploy the harder we shall find it to extricate ourselves without
unacceptable costs if the war goes badly. "71
George Ball was a shrewd individual. He knew that he that he could not hope to
attract Lyndon Johnson's attention by making an argument based on moral grounds. And so
he used ideas which would make an impact on the President. Ball knew that Johnson was a
skilled domestic politician. He warned the President that the American people would not
tolerate a long drawn conflict and would oppose him if US casualties mounted. Ball even
invoked the example of the Korean war to convince the President that another war in the Far
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East would create domestic opposition just as it had done for Harry S. Truman in 1952. The
ultimate domino in the domino theory was the Presidency itself. Ball was clearly determined
to shock the President. In ominous language he argued in his memorandum o f October 1964,
that "the frustrations and anxieties [of the American people] that marked the latter phase o f
the Korean war would be recalled and revived - and multiplied in intensity. " n In April 1965 he
told the President that he doubted that the American people would tolerate massive casualties
if the war was not ended swiftly.73 And Ball was not convinced that American power would
rapidly put an end to this particular war.
Most of George Ball's colleagues believed that the United States prestige and
reputation was at stake in Vietnam. In their scenario Uncle Sam would lose credibility in the
eyes of her allies if she failed to meet the Communist threat in Vietnam. Ball did agree with his
colleagues that American prestige was at stake in South Vietnam. But his logic differed from
his colleagues. From his extensive contacts with America's European partners, Ball had
discovered that they were not particularly impressed by America's show of power in South
Vietnam. Indeed Ball was fearful that America might be seen as the aggressor in this conflict.
In his first memorandum in 1964, he forecast that the United States "could well find ourselves
in a position not wholly dissimilar from that of Britain and France at Suez. World opinion
could well be against us. "74 In July 1965 he was even more explicit. He informed the President
th at" the principal anxiety of our NATO allies is that we have become too pre-occupied with
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an area which seems to them an irrelevance..." According to the Under Secretary they were
more than willing to accept a settlement in Vietnam. He strongly contended that America's
European friends would actually respect the United States more for negotiating a settlement.75
The distinct lack o f a stable, coherent government in South Vietnam seemed to
George Ball an extremely good justification for American withdrawal. The United States had
made a commitment to the government of the Republic of South Vietnam. In Ball's opinion,
the United States was now effectively backing an army not a country. In July 1965 Ball in his
typical forthright way declared in one of his memoranda " by and large the world knows that
the government in Saigon is a joke..." No-one in his sane mind according to Ball would
interpret a US withdrawal from Vietnam " as a failure to keep its commitments."76 In one last
desperate attempt to persuade the President to seek a way out of Vietnam, he told him that the
Vietnam war was in effect a lost cause. He caustically remarked " the government in Saigon is
a travesty. In a very real sense, South Vietnam is a country with an army and no
government...a deep commitment of American forces in South Vietnam...would be a
catastrophic error. "77
George Ball failed in his quest to stop the bombing campaign and the commitment of
US ground forces in action. Yet he had not failed because Lyndon Johnson despised dissent
against an established policy. LB J tolerated and later encouraged Ball to develop his thoughts.
The President had come to respect this astute individual who had succeeded in the cut-throat
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world o f lawyers and international statesmen. And besides, Dean Rusk liked and supported
Ball. That gave Ball's position in the White House added credibility. Nor was Ball afraid to
speak his mind, and LBJ admired that quality. Jack Valenti recalled that " there were two
things about Ball which Johnson admired. One was that he had great courage and the other
was that he was a man of literate grace."78 Finally, Ball was extremely loyal to the President.
Whilst he was willing to argue against the policy favoured by most of the President's advisers,
he would not make his dissent public. Indeed he often defended US policy in Vietnam in
speeches and interviews.
Some historians have suggested that the Under Secretary's dissent and the meetings
in July 1965 were part of an elaborate charade on the part of Lyndon Johnson to show to
historians that he considered all possible options before going to war. Ball himself hotly
refuted this idea. His dissent was original thought. Lyndon Johnson did not even see Ball's
May and October memoranda of 1964. Admittedly, immediately before the July meetings
Cyrus Vance, the Deputy Secretary of Defence had cabled Robert McNamara in Vietnam
informing him that he had met with the President to discuss future policy in Vietnam. He
reported "it is his current intention to proceed with the 34 battalion plan."79 However, George
Ball had known that Lyndon Johnson had altered his decisions on occasions in the past, and
the cable indicated that it was LBJ’s current intention to send the thirty four battalions. When
asked by his biographer if the July meetings were a charade, Ball replied that the President and
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his officials were extremely busy people. They simply did not have time, in his words "to play
games."80
Ball's recommendations did appear to make an impression on the President. Bill
Moyers who finally passed Ball's October memorandum to the President in February 1965
told Ball that the President was impressed by some o f Ball's arguments.81 In April 1965 the
President asked Ball to investigate all possible means of withdrawal from Vietnam. In his
sessions with the military, he asked the very same questions which Ball himself had raised on
numerous occasions. But Ball - the one man in the administration who appeared to have long
term vision - went unheard. Ball's failure was in part due to the opposition to his plans on the
part of the three White House heavyweights, Dean Rusk, McGeorge Bundy and Robert
McNamara. In addition although he was an influential figure, he did not hold cabinet rank,
and this worked against him. Dean Rusk was still the US Secretary of State and his opinion
carried more weight. Bill Bundy the Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs noted
that "if Ball had been secretary...McNamara would have paid more attention and I dare say so
would the President. ',82
Ball often used the failure of the French in 1954 to support his contention that the
United States could not win in Vietnam. Unfortunately his colleagues soon wearied of the
French analogy, and dismissed his views. Besides, relations between France and the United
States were at an all time low. Vetoing Britain's application to the EEC and developing a force
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de frappe had not endeared them to the Americans. Comparing the United States to France
irritated his colleagues in goverment. Bill Bundy recalled "every now and then he overdid the
comparison in a setting when we were so cross with the French for so many other reasons.
Sometimes it became quite irritating to hear that argument."83 Lyndon Johnson ultimately
rejected the advice offered to him by his Under Secretary of State, but he did so after careful
consideration and much thought.
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The Ambassador: General Maxwell Taylor
Max Taylor had gone to Saigon in August 1964 to replace Henry Cabot Lodge. Taylor
was the individual who argued in the 1950s that Dulles and Eisenhower had erred in their
reliance on nuclear weapons and the doctrine of massive retaliation. The United States should
be prepared to fight local wars according to Taylor. The situation in Saigon appeared to be
extremely precarious when Max Taylor had left. If anyone could bring order out of the chaos
in South Vietnam it was Maxwell Taylor. Yet even the cool efficient Taylor struggled in the
midst of plots, conspiracies and riots. This was not the sort of war which American soldiers
should be fighting in. Moreover, the South Vietnamese did not seem to Taylor even willing to
fight the Viet Cong. The Ambassador believed that airstrikes against the North might
encourage the South Vietnamese to continue the war, but he was extremely suspicious of
sending US troops into this quagmire. It would encourage the South to slacken their efforts
and allow the United States to wage the war. Taylor strongly objected to the demand o f the
military for US troops, but by July 1965 he had lost the battle and had concurred in the
recommendation of the JCS to escalate the war.
The Ambassador was not recommending an aerial campaign against the North in the
first six months of his stay in Vietnam. He recommended airstrikes in response to specific
atrocities committed against American forces. Maxwell Taylor arrived in Saigon at a time
when the Viet Cong appeared to be stepping up their campaign. On several occasions US
bases were the subject o f their attacks. Just before the November election the Viet Cong had
attacked the base at Bien Hoa, and immediately before Christmas, the Brinks hotel was
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bombed. Max Taylor was reportedly infuriated by such an attack; for him this was an insult to
the American flag. On both occasions he recommended swift retribution in the form of
airstrikes against the North Vietnamese. On both occasions the Johnson administration
rejected his recommendations.
Taylor was witnessing firsthand the political squabbles and factionalism in the Saigon
government. He wanted to use American power against the North, but he was suspicious of
the depth o f the South Vietnamese commitment to the war, and he urged the President not to
escalate the war any further. At a meeting in Washington in September 1964 the Ambassador,
accepted that the United States "would have to act more forcefully against the North." He
added that he was not convinced that the time was propitious to begin such a campaign.84 In
November 1964 he again stressed that the political infighting must cease before the United
States would embark upon any campaign. For Taylor, this would be an indication that the
South Vietnamese were committed to the war. In a telegram to the Department of State he
wrote "it is highly desirable to have...minimum government before accepting the risks
inherent in any escalation programme. "85
But like so many others who experienced Saigonese politics, Taylor soon came to
despair of the willingness o f the South Vietnamese to create an orderly stable government. In
late December when the South Vietnamese had overthrown one in a long line of civilian
governments Max Taylor could restrain himself no longer. Summoning the heads of the South
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Vietnamese military he unleashed his fury, and dressed them down as if they were lowly
cadets.He warned them "we cannot carry on forever if you do things like this."86 His
frustration with the situation manifested itself in his final telegram o f 1964 where he even
contemplated disengagement from South Vietnam. This though was an unusual telegram
from the Ambassador. Taylor was no George Ball. He firmly believed in the US role in
Vietnam and in the theory o f containment. Rather than using the shambles in Saigon as an
excuse for withdrawal Taylor now began to press for an aerial campaign to bolster an ailing
government and help raise its morale. In November 1964 Taylor had had told Secretary Rusk
that "an attack [against the North] would...give pulmotor treatment for a government in
extremis."87 Political exhortations were clearly ineffectual. In January 1965 Taylor sent an
extremely pessimistic cable to Washington, informing them that there was constant political
infighting in both the government and the armed forces. The United States could not expect
anything more "than marginal government... with continued decline of national morale-unless
something new is added to make up for those things we cannot control." Something new was
an aerial campaign against North Vietnam. Taylor harboured no illusions about the strategic
impact of airstrikes. He hoped that a campaign would halt the decline in South Vietnam and
perhaps convince the North Vietnamese to end their support of the insurgency. In the cable he
admitted to the President that he agreed with him th a t" this guerilla war cannot be won from
the air. ',88 But still LBJ procrastinated. When McGeorge Bundy was present in South

86 Declassified Documents. Department o f State. Cable from Taylor to Rusk December 27 1964
87 ibid. Cable from Taylor to Rusk November 10 1964
88 FRUS. Vietnam January-June 1965 ( Washington,US GPO, 1996 )p. 6-11

75

Vietnam at the time of the bombing at Pleiku in February 1965, Taylor saw his opportunity.
The Ambassador hoped to use the incident to launch a sustained bombing campaign. He
cabled Washington stating that he would appreciate prompt decisions.. .for reprisal attacks."
He suggested that the United States should not simply respond to specific atrocities
committed by the Viet Cong and North Vietnamese any longer. The administration should
now launch the full scale aerial campaign against the North Vietnamese in response to general
actions of the Viet Cong. Taylor noted th a t" it would be tantamount to the so-called Phase II
escalation..."89
Lyndon Johnson finally acted on Taylor's advice and implemented Operation Rolling
Thunder in late February 1965. However, Taylor's policy had significant repercussions.
American troops would be needed to protect the planes. William C. Westmoreland the US
Commander in Vietnam had a low opinion of the South Vietnamese, and did not think them
able to provide the security for the US airbase at Da Nang. Taylor understood why US troops
would be needed at Da Nang, but feared that sending one battalion would create an
inexorable movement to send more troops to the region. He fired off a cable expressing,
strong opposition to the introduction of American troops. He argued that "Once this policy is
breached, it will be very difficult to hold the line..." The Ambassador was certain that the mere
presence o f US soldiers in South Vietnam would encourage the South Vietnamese to allow
the United States to bear the burden in South Vietnam.90 Westmoreland's request was granted
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in spite of his opposition. And just as Max Taylor had forecast, a momentum for further
escalation appeared to be building up. In April LBJ had approved the change o f mission for
the existing marines in South Vietnam. The ambassador was clearly unhappy; on April 17 he
cabled McGeorge Bundy that the decision to use US troops in combat missions showed "a far
greater willingness to get into the ground war than I had discerned in Washington." Taylor did
not attempt to hide his opposition, telling Bundy " I would regard such a change in policy as
disastrous in its likely effects.1,91
But Max Taylor could not fight the combined opinions of his colleagues. The JCS,
CINPAC, and General Westmoreland were all becoming annoyed at Max Taylor's refusal to
accede to their demands. And they would not secure the troops they needed unless Taylor
climbed aboard. As the US ambassador, he could prevent further troop deployments arriving
by refusing to clear them with the South Vietnamese. McNamara met with Taylor and the JCS
at Honolulu in April 1965. At Honolulu Max Taylor lost the battle. His former colleagues on
the JCS were ascendant. William C. Westmoreland in particular dominated the conference
and secured some of the troops he requested. The generals had effectively worn down
Taylor's resistance. From this point on Taylor was as committed as McNamara, Bundy, Rusk
and Westmoreland.

By May the Ambassador was supporting the opinion of the US

Commander. In a telegram to the State Department in May he argued that an air assault
supported by an effective campaign on the ground could alter the course of the w ar.92
Lyndon Johnson did not like or trust the generals who served him. But Max Taylor
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was different. He appeared to be universally admired in government circles. It was not just
that he had a distinguished record in World War II. He was a general who appeared to
understand the difficulties which faced the civilians in government. And he appeared to
believe in civilian control of the military structure. The Joint Chiefs were rather suspicious
when he had become Chairman under Kennedy. Quite simply, he was not one of them. And
this suspicion endeared him even more first to John F. Kennedy, Secretary of Defence Robert
McNamara and then to Lyndon Johnson.93 LBJ clearly had respect for the former general.
Even after he had completed his stint as ambassador in South Vietnam the President
continued to call upon him for advice. Taylor's conversion to the more hawkish position
pushed by the military and most o f Johnson's civilian advisers would have had an impact on the
way the President viewed the situation in Vietnam.

93 D. Halberstam, The Best and the Brightest ( New York,Random House, 1972 )pp.486-489
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The Fringes of Power : Senator Mike Mansfield, Clark Clifford and General Dwight
Eisenhower
In Congress, Senator Mike Mansfield ( D-Montana ), who took a particular interest in
Asian affairs consistently expressed his opposition to the policy o f the Johnson
administration. He had begun to seriously question the US presence in Vietnam under John F.
Kennedy, and his dissent continued when his old friend Lyndon Johnson became President.
Mansfield had come to subscribe to the view o f the French President, Charles De Gaulle that
Vietnam was a "rotten country." In 1964 he gave endorsements to De Gaulle's call for the
neutralisation of Vietnam and in 1965 fought the plans to escalate the war. Like George Ball,
Mansfield was unconvinced that Vietnam was important to US national security, and was
even more unsure of the US ability to achieve a victory in this situation. The Senator had
prophetically argued that as each day passed without any sign of a willingness to leave, the
United States would be drawn into a full scale war.
Mansfield had been urging Kennedy to tread extremely carefully in the quagmire in
Vietnam throughout 1962 and 1963. When his former Senatorial colleague ascended to the
Presidency on Kennedy's death, Mansfield did not wait long before sending his opinions to the
new President. Clearly hoping to influence LBJ, he fired a volley of memoranda at him in
December 1963 and January 1964. The Senator was launching a full scale assault on the
convictions and ideas which underpinned US foreign policy. The thoughtful Senator did not
believe that the loss of South Vietnam represented a serious threat to US national security. In
his first memorandum, he pointedly asked the President "what national interests in Asia
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would steel the American people for the massive costs of an ever deepening involvement... ?"94
In February, the Senator was even more blunt, telling the President "I see no national interest
which would justify that plunge [in South Vietnam] and emphatically do not recommend it."
Up to this point, the war against the Viet Cong was the responsibility of the South
Vietnamese.

But Mansfield worried that the logic of the President and the men who

surrounded him would cause America to take up the burden of the South Vietnamese. He
pleaded with the President to give neutralisation of South Vietnam a chance. It might save the
United States from becoming further involved in this debacle in South Vietnam. He urged the
President to consider some of the ideas being put forward by the French government.95 In May
and June he publicly supported De Gaulle's call to reconvene the Geneva conference. It was
"the last train out for peace in Southeast Asia.1,96
Mike Mansfield's advice was being ignored by the White House. But the failure of the
White House to heed the Senator's advice emboldened him to speak out more forcefully.
Mansfield had noticed how the President's advisers appeared to be desperate to become
involved in this war. And Mansfield was not sure that this war was worth fighting. The United
States seemed more committed to the cause of an independent South Vietnam than the local
population in South Vietnam. After the bombing of the US barracks at Pleiku in February
1965, the President had summoned the National Security to discuss a response. LBJ was in a
particularly emotional state declaring that he would not leave American soldiers, his boys, to
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fight this war unprotected. Mansfield who had remained silent as the members o f the Council
spoke, finally urged the President to reconsider his decision telling him "the attack has opened
many eyes...It appears that the local populace in South Vietnam is not now behind us or else
the Viet Cong could not have carried out their surprise attack. "97 Mansfield was determined
to influence the President.

Only days later he sent the President another letter again

emphasising his belief that the South Vietnamese were not interested in fighting this war, and
in all likelihood would not assist the United States in its campaign. In Mansfield's opinion, the
United States should not help a country which was not willing to fight. He added "I am
persuaded that the trend towards enlargement of the conflict...is not going to provide an
answer."98 The failure of South Vietnamese politicians to create an effective government
heightened Mansfield's fears about the conflict which US troops seemed about to enter. In
view o f the desperate political and military situation, the Senator believed that US troops
would be mired down in a war without end. On June 9th Mansfield sent yet another
memorandum to the President telling him that the United States was " no longer dealing with
anyone who represents anybody in a political sense." If the United States stayed the course in
Vietnam, she might well be trapped there for decades. Once again he urged Johnson "to stop
waiting for signals," and, "launch a powerful diplomatic peace offensive to try to get to a
conference table."99 To the end, Mansfield remained implacably opposed to any moves to
escalate the war. In a meeting just before President Johnson announced that more troops
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would be sent to Vietnam, he candidly told LBJ that the United States had no commitment to
South Vietnam and should seek a negotiated settlement.100
Mike Mansfield like George Ball had failed to persuade the President to change
course in Vietnam. His relationship to the President was partly responsible for his failure to
shape the course of events. The Senator might have been regarded in congressional circles as
the expert on Far Eastern Affairs, but Johnson was not especially in awe o f him in the way that
he was o f Kennedy's men. Mike Mansfield had been LBJ's protege in Congress; the then
Senator Majority Leader had appointed him to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee in the
1950s and when he had left Congress for the executive branch, he had championed Mike
Mansfield's campaign to become Senate Majority Leader.101The relationship between the two
was far from equal. Mansfield owed his position to Lyndon Johnson and everyone knew it.
When LBJ had left Congress in 1961, Mansfield allowed the Vice President to keep his office
in the Senate. While the President listened to the opinions of the Senate Majority Leader in
1964 and 1965, he did not defer to his recommendations in the way that he did to Bundy,
Rusk, and McNamara. These men towered above Mansfield in Johnson's world, and their
recommendations almost inevitably carried more weight with the President.
The lawyer in the White House: Clark Clifford.
Bundy, Rusk and McNamara had all given their approval. But LBJ was seeking as
many opinions as possible. He turned to Clark Clifford, servant and friend to two Democratic
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Presidents, for his opinion on this war in Vietnam. Clifford had been at the side o f Harry
Truman when the future of democracy in Europe and the Far East appeared to be facing a
massive threat from the Soviet Union. Clifford however was, as Lyndon Johnson would find
out, not in favour of US intervention in this particular crisis.
Clifford had come to realise that bombing alone would not persuade the Viet Cong to
abandon their insurgency; only a massive influx of US ground troops could possibly have that
effect, and Clark Clifford was unsure if they could fight in the jungles o f Asia. Clifford had
supported Truman's police action in Korea, but the terrain there was very different to that of
Vietnam. When LBJ sought his opinion in late spring of 1965, Clifford was not afraid to
question the assumptions o f Johnson's main policymakers. In a letter to the President, he
expressed considerable disquiet about the rush into this war. The confidence in American
power which was so redolent of a Bundy or a Rusk memorandum was noticeably missing in
this letter. His analysis was extremely gloomy. Clifford informed the President "this could be
a quagmire. It could turn into an open ended commitment on our part that would take more
and more ground troops without a realistic hope for victory." The US success in driving the
Communists back in Korea did not automatically mean that the United States troops would
sweep all before them. Vietnam was not Korea stated Clifford. The physical conditions, and
the terrain were completely different.102 When the JCS confidently predicted that US troops
w ould," cream " the enemy, Clifford was not persuaded. He told the President "I don't think
they are being straight with us."103 Clifford had attracted the President's attention. He

102 FRUS. Vietnam. January-June 1965 (Washington, US GPO, 1996 )p.672 Letter from Clifford to LBJ May 171965
103 C. Clifford, Counsel to the President. A memoir ( New York, Random House, 1991 )p.415

83
summoned him for one final consultation at Camp David in late July 1965. But Clifford faced
a task o f Herculanean proportions. Robert S. McNamara was also present at the discussion,
and Clifford had to defeat his arguments to win over the President.
Clifford tried to reassure Lyndon Johnson that the consequences of a tactical
withdrawal in Vietnam were not as dire as Bundy, Rusk and McNamara were contending.
Vietnam did not appear to be a major battleground in the Cold War in Clifford's opinion. And
with Defense Secretary McNamara watching intently, he told the President that the United
States' international prestige would not be damaged in the long term by a M u re to fight in
Vietnam. He advised the President to "pick the spots where the stakes are highest for us and
where we have the greatest ability to prevail." If the President chose to approve McNamara's
course, Clifford dramatically declared that he could not "see anything but catastrophe ", for
his country.104
Like Bundy, Rusk and McNamara, Clifford enjoyed the President's respect and
admiration, a privilege granted to few men. In addition Clifford was beholden to no man. He
was a well established Washington lawyer and was independent of the President. But Clark
Clifford, counsel to two former Presidents, had perhaps entered this bureaucatic battle too
late to be able to influence the course adopted by the President. He himself noted that the
President did not reply to his letter of May 1965 urging a withdrawal, and during his
discussions with the President in late July, Lyndon Johnson had cut short the discussion. And
although this elegant Washington lawyer described himselfas a close associate o f the
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President, he was not as close to LBJ as Bundy, Rusk and McNamara were. He simply did not
have the access to the President needed to influence him. He had informed the President of his
opinions on only two or three occasions. By contrast Bundy, Rusk and McNamara had
numerous opportunities to influence the President. When Clifford succeeded McNamara as
Secretary of Defence in 1968, he was instrumental in convincing the President to suspend the
bombing and enter negotiations.
General Dwight D. Eisenhower
As President, Dwight Eisenhower had ruled against intervention in Indochina in 1954
when the French were on the brink of collapsing. Eisenhower had been extremely careful
during his tenure about sending US troops into combat. But he was also a patriot and a
soldier. If the United States had made a commitment, the US government must fulfil that
commitment. In two meetings with the President, Eisenhower urged him to send as many
troops to the region to achieve a victory against the Viet Cong and the North Vietnamese.
Shortly after authorising the first retaliation strikes in February 1965 against the North
Vietnamese, Lyndon Johnson met with the former President, to ask his opinions on Vietnam.
Ike was after all the victor of campaigns in North Africa, and most famously Europe in 1944.
And as President, he had presided over numerous foreign policy crises in Europe, the Far East
and Africa. Eisenhower acknowledged that the situation in South Vietnam "was going to
pieces, " and that it would take a monumental effort to rescue the region from the clutches of
the Communists. But declared the former President, that was no excuse to leave the area. The
United States government had committed the flag. And as Eisenhower himself had once said,
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if you commit the US flag, you commit it to win. In Guatemala in 1954 he had authorised the
use of American air power to support an American backed invasion, and in 1961 after the Bay
of Pigs debacle, he had lectured the bewildered Kennedy for his failure to give air support to
the invasion o f the CIA trained force. In his meeting with LBJ, Eisenhower dispensed similar
advice. He told the President "the US has put its prestige onto the proposition of keeping
Southeast Asia free...we cannot let the Indo-Chinese peninsula go...when we say we will help
other countries we must then be staunch." The former President expressed a hope that forces
would not be needed, but if the situation called for US forces the President should deploy
them.105 Eisenhower warned the President that the air war could not defeat the North
Vietnamese, but it could weaken the resolve of the Communists to continue the insurgency. It
was almost the same view which LBJ had heard from his advisers. And this time it was coming
from the victor o f D-Day, a man who knew about war.
Johnson clearly valued the advice of the former President. In July 1965, when the
momentum for an expanded war began to increase, LBJ needing guidance again turned to
Eisenhower. LBJ who clearly had qualms about putting more troops in South Vietnam, asked
him on the telephone if he was pursuing the correct course. Eisenhower was determined to
stiffen Johnson's resolve, and repeated his February speech only this time with more emphasis.
He lectured Johnson "when you once appeal to force in an international situation involving
military help for a nation, you have to go all out. This is a war and as long as they ( the enemy )
are putting men there, my advice is do what you have to do..." Eisenhower had a large
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personal investment in South Vietnam, having helped to create it in 1954, and he was certainly
not going to allow Lyndon Johnson to abandon it. He declared "we are not going to be run out
of a free country we helped to establish. "106
Dwight D. Eisenhower was a respected soldier, and a national hero. Lyndon Johnson
both trusted and respected the opinions of the man who had presided over the Allied
campaigns in North Africa and Normandy. In addition, Eisenhower had been in office during
serveral international crises and had survived with his reputation intact. Consequently his
advice carried great weight with a President who lacked Eisenhower's military experience,
and was unsure of himself in the international arena. LBJ later wrote in his memoirs that he
had tremendous respect for "the opinions of this wise and experienced man who knew so well
the problems and burdens of the Presidency."107 Bundy, Rusk, and McNamara were all
talented men whose counsel the President actively sought.

And Eisenhower's advice

reinforced the recommendations of the civilians surrounding the President, and gave them
added credibility in Johnson's opinion.
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The Military Advisers
Johnson's principal military advisers, the JCS, and General William Westmoreland
did not like the way in which LBJ and his civilians wanted to fight this war. Fighting wars were
their particular area of expertise, and they resented the restraints being placed upon them by
the cautious Lyndon Johnson. If the United States would be in a war, then she would use all o f
her might and her power to humble her enemy. The military had come to believe that covert
actions would have no effect in this troubled region, and throughout 1964 and 1965 they
bombarded both Secretary of Defence McNamara and the President with memoranda urging
that the administration embark on a full scale aerial campaign against the North Vietnamese.
The air force was convinced that a dramatic show o f American air power would have positive
effects in Vietnam, while the army believed that an air war must be supported by an effective
campaign on the ground. In any event they were all agreed on the use o f force. Force would
sap the morale and the will o f the Viet Cong and North Vietnamese, and would persuade them
to halt their activities in Vietnam.
Lyndon Johnson was beginning to learn about the magnitude of the task which faced
him in Vietnam in 1964. But he was a new President, untried and inexperienced in foreign
policy, and so he preferred to pursue a more cautious policy in South Vietnam. The US State
Department and the mission in Vietnam were ordered to make a greater effort by the
President. But there was no change in policy forthcoming from the White House. The military
chafed at his refusal to embark on a more vigorous policy. In January 1964, the Joint Chiefs of
Staff complained that they were being impeded by unnecessary self-imposed restrictions. In
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their opinion the US war effort was suffering because o f the restraints imposed by the White
House. The Joint Chiefs told the Secretary o f Defence "these restrictions... all tend to make
the task in Vietnam in the end more costly." The JCS argued that force would be the panacea
to America's problems. They recommended a "reversal of attitude," and and the adoption o f a
more aggressive course. They concluded by recommending that the President embark on a
massive aerial campaign and commit US forces in support of the South Vietnamese units.108
But the Chiefs did not have the ear of the President. They were becoming increasingly
frustrated at the refusal of the civilians to unleash the forces at America's disposal. In March
1964 they sent another memorandum to the Defence Secretary arguing that " US intentions
and resolve to extend the war as necessary should be clear immediately by overt military
actions against the DRV."109 The split between the civilians and the military revealed itself in
war game in 1964 on Vietnam. The hawkish General Curtis LeMay was irritated at the limits
being placed on the use o f air power, and he told the President's representative, McGeorge
Bundy, that the United States had to "bomb them into Stone Age," to change the course of the
war. Bundy acidly replied to the general "maybe they're already there."110 When Max Taylor
left the Pentagon for Saigon and suggested carrying out retaliatory' tit-for-tat' raids against
the North Vietnamese, the Joint Chiefs could not hide their disdain. Now one of their own
members advocating the sort of campaign which was impeding the US effort in Vietnam.
Earle Wheeler the Chairman of the JCS informed McNamara in November 1964 th at" tit-for-
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tat," was restrictive, and would deny the United States any flexibility in their campaign against
the Viet Cong. 111
In February 1965 LBJ had approved the bombing campaign against the North. But the
army in particular was convinced that only a full scale air war combined with an effective
campaign on the ground would cause the Viet Cong and the North Vietnamese to end the
insurgency in South Vietnam. In March 1965 Army Chief of Staff General Harold K. Johnson
paid a visit to South Vietnam, and after conferring with General Westmoreland,
recommended dispatching another American division.112 In Saigon William Westmoreland
was increasingly losing confidence in the ability of the South Vietnamese to wage an effective
land campaign. He certainly did not entrust security o f the US airbase at Da Nang to the
ARVN, and cabled the JCS in February 1965 asking for US troops to be sent to protect the
airbase.113 The Chiefs shared Westmoreland's lack of confidence in the competence of the
South Vietnamese. In their view only US troops could stave off impending defeat in Vietnam.
In March 1965 Wheeler sent a memorandum to McNamara urging him to dispatch US ground
forces to the region. Wheeler warned the Secretary "if the present trends in South Vietnamare
not reversed, the counterinsurgency campaign in South Vietnam will be lost. "114
As the months passed, Westmoreland became more worried. The VC were stepping
up their camapign and were sweeping all before them. In May 1965 they destroyed the town of
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Song Be, and at Ba Gia in late May they routed an ARVN regiment.115 Defeat was looming.
The US Commander cabled the JCS on June 7 1965 telling them that he saw "no course of
action open...except to reinforce our efforts with additional US or third country forces."
Westmoreland, like many o f LBJ’s civilian advisers, was extremely confident that US troops
with their superior skills and equipment would reverse the tide. He wrote "I am extremely
confident that US troops with their energy, mobility and firepower can successfully take the
fight to the VC. "116 In July when Johnson and his advisers were now seriously considering the
commitment o f US ground troops, the US Commander dispatched a final cable emphasising
that the South Vietnamese could not resist the pressure from the VC without adequate
support on the ground.117
Lyndon Johnson was extremely suspicious o f the intentions of the US armed forces.
He was convinced that they were seeking to drag him into a war in Vietnam. He once told his
advisers "they' re trying to get me into a war over there. It will destroy me. I turned them down
three times last week."118 The President grew irritated at their insistence that he wage a
massive aerial campaign in Vietnam. In March 1965, he summoned the Army Chief of Staff,
Harold K. Johnson and dressed him down, telling him "you're not giving me any solutions for
this damn pissant little country...I want some answers."119 Indeed Johnson did his utmost to
keep the JCS as far away as possible. He did not wish to be seen with them and until 1965
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excluded them from meetings.120 Yet the demands of the military for a bombing campaign and
the use ofUS ground forces were all granted. The military had succeeded mainly because they
had won Secretary of Defence Robert S. McNamara over to their point o f view. McNamara
had become known in Washington for his duels with the Joint Chiefs o f Staff. He had fought
them over the military budget and the Test Ban Treaty, and had won. But this time,
McNamara had not been quite as critical of the Chiefs recommendations as he had been in the
past, and had accepted their advice.121 Convincing McNamara of the validity of their opinions
had been a majorcoup for the military. McNamara, as has been seen, was a powerful member
of the cabinet with influence over the President. In addition, both Mac Bundy and Dean Rusk
had supported the programme of the military. The support of these important policymakers
had given a large amount of credibility to the advice of the Chiefs, and ensured that the
President ultimately implemented the proposals they had long been demanding.
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CONCLUSION
Vietnam has been explored, debated and scrutinised by historians for the past three
decades. On the debate over the administration's failure to inform the public that the United
States was at war, historians have traditionally tended to ascribe more emphasis to the role
which domestic politics played in the President's decision to stifle discussion and debate. This
thesis has shown that international politics was as important as domestic politics in shaping
the course pursued by the administration. Historians have also tended to approach this
subject chronologically.

This thesis has examined this issue thematically.

A thematic

approach helps to clarify the main argument, and reveals the complexity of the decision
making process which might become submerged in a chronological narrative on the topic.
The thematic approach has also revealed the primacy o f ideology in the policymaking process.
Furthermore, it has shown the wide range of opinions and advice which contributed to the
formulation o f US foreign policy. The ultimate aim o f this thesis was to demonstrate that the
decision making process i s complex.
Clearly Lyndon Johnson had not devised a pre-planned scheme to take his country to a
long-drawn and debilitating conflict. This thesis has shown that a combination of different
reasons had caused the President to feel that he had no choice but to escalate the war. It might
be easy in hindsight to dismiss Johnson's and his advisers notions of a world wide Communist
conspiracy as being somewhat fanciful, but in 1964, the President and his officials did believe
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in such a threat. Very few people in government were willing to seriously question
containment or the domino theory.

Even more importantly Johnson and his advisers

espoused the argument o f NSC 68 that it was the responsibility of the United States to thwart
this threat. It was this menace which caused them to look upon the situation in South Vietnam
with concern. However, it was also the sheer incompetence and inability of successive South
Vietnamese regimes to deal with the Viet Cong which actually prompted the administration to
abandon their advisory role in Vietnam, and to adopt a much more active position there. But it
is important to understand that the Cold War ideology outlook o f the administration and the
situation in South Vietnam were intertwined. If the United States had not been convinced
about the existence of an international Communist conspiracy, they would not have
intervened when the South appeared to be on the point of collapse in June 1965. Johnson and
his advisers had followed an essentially reactionary policy: the action over the incident at the
Gulf o f Tonkin was taken in response to a perceived attack. Moreover, the decision to bomb
the north was taken in response to the disastrous situation in the South, as was the situation to
place troops in the region. However, the aerial campaign sucked the President ever deeper
into the morass in Vietnam. Planes needed protection, and only US troops could provide it.
And once US troops waded ashore at Da Nang, the momentum for escalation increased. Mike
Mansfield once cautioned the President that "escalation begets escalation." He was proved to
be right in Vietnam.
Lyndon Johnson, though derived no pleasure from being a war President. He was a
domestic politician par excellence, and the war was deflecting attention away from the Great
Society he so desperately wanted to build. Ultimately the prevailing ideologies of US foreign
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policy were too entrenched to challenge, and Lyndon Johnson believed that he had no choice
but to escalate.
The President's pre-existing beliefs were buttressed both by the advice rendered by his
principal advisers, and by his own personality.

In 1964 and 1965, Bundy, Rusk and

McNamara were still seen by LB J as Kennedy men serving him. Lyndon Johnson had not yet
put his personal stamp on them, made them his men. And LB J was much more critical, and
some would say, merciless to those he considered to be Johnson men. In addition, his three
main advisers were by far the most able men he had ever met. Bundy was arrogant, and
condescending. Yet at the same time he was so lucid, so incisive, so sharp that Johnson could
not help but admire him.Dean Rusk's analyses were so methodical, and so assured that they
must be correct. And Bob McNamara was efficient, intelligent and ruthless. Johnson showed
them more respect and deference than he would have done to his own men. He had perhaps
accepted their advice too uncritically. Johnson would later remark that perhaps his greatest
mistake was to have retained Kennedy's men in 1963. But in 1964 and 1965 all three had
established a close working relationship with the President and were able to influence him.
The advice of these men reinforced what Lyndon Johnson already believed; that the
Communists were determined to achieve world hegemony, and that only the United States
could meet and defeat this threat to the free world. And if men of the calibre of Dean Rusk,
Robert McNamara, and Mac Bundy believed in the domino theory, then it had to be true in
LBJ'sview.
The most important of these advisers was the Secretary of State. He had formed a
close personal friendship with the President which neither Bundy nor McNamara had. Rusk
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was also the most fervent believer in the US role in Vietnam. In later years, Bundy would
recant his earlier views on Vietnam and McNamara would leave the Defense Department
ini 968 tormented by the war.1 But Dean Rusk did not have regrets. Although the Secretary
was initially worried about using US troops, he never questioned the assumptions
underpinning the US commitment to Vietnam, and he accepted the recommendations o f the
military. Those men who argued against escalating the war needed to win over the Secretary
to persuade the President to leave Vietnam. But Bundy and McNamara also played a pivotal
role in the decision making process. Bundy had not exposed the President to the full range of
dissent within the administration, and had become a strong advocate of using force in
Vietnam. McNamara's mastery of facts and figures and his staunch support for escalation
during the debates also impressed the President.
Only George Ball seriously questioned the fundamental assumptions underlying US
foreign policy. Max Taylor had raised questions about using US ground troops in Vietnam,
but he was a firm believer in the Communist threat and in the presence o f the United States in
Vietnam. Bill Bundy, the Assistant Secretary for Far Eastern Affairs had come to believe that
there was some validity in Ball's argument that the United States might become bogged down
in a protracted conflict, and he wrote a memorandum in June 1965 entitled "a Middle Course
in Vietnam.” In it he suggested that the President should not send more than 85, 000 troops
because the administration had no proof that American troops could fight in the Asian
jungles.2 But Bundy was not questioning the importance of South Vietnam to US national

1 A lm o s t twenty five years later McNamara would admit in his memoirs that he and his colleagues had erred in escalating
the Vietnam war.
2 FRUS. Vietnam. June-December 1965 (Washington, US GPO,l 996)pp. 113-115 Memo from Bill Bundy to LBJ July 1
1965
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security or the presence of the United States in Vietnam. Ball was the only member in
Johnson's inner circle who was willing to think the unthinkable; that Vietnam was not crucial
to US security, and that the United States should withdraw. But because Ball was a
Europhile, some members of the administration argued that he was not interested in the plight
or the battles of the poor and underprivileged in Vietnam. It should also be remembered that
Ball was responsible for relations with the European powers at the State Department, and he
worked on the US position in Vietnam in his spare time. Clark Clifford formed an alliance
with the Under Secretary and urged LBJ to seek a way out of the war. But Clifford was not a
White House insider at this point, and he was not involved in the bureaucratic battles over
Vietnam. Since his access to the President was limited, it was difficult for him to sway
Johnson.
There was also an element of machismo in Lyndon Johnson which shaped his handling
of the Vietnam war. Lyndon Johnson was President of the most powerful nation in the world,
and he was not going to allow a "damn pissant raggedy ass" fourth rate country like North
Vietnam to dictate to the leader of the free world. The North Vietnamese were not going to
defeat Lyndon Johnson. He would demonstrate to them that that he would not abandon South
Vietnam. Lyndon Johnson of Texas and the United States was not a coward, was not afraid to
fight those who threatened the free world.3 And Johnson's determination to show to the
North Vietnamese and the Viet Cong that he would not be dictated to made it harder for him to
disengage from this conflict which was an irritant and a hindrance to his Great Society.
And so it came about that in the summer o f1965, Lyndon Johnson stumbled into a

3 D. Halberstam, The Best and the Brightest (New York, Random House, 1972)p.531
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conflict which would destroy his Presidency. The Time correspondent, Charley Mohr once
wrote that Vietnam was "a graveyard o f lost hopes, destroyed vanity, glib promises, and good
intentions.1,4 It proved to be precisely that for Lyndon Baines Johnson.

4 W. Prochnau, Once Upon A Distant War. David Halberstam, Neil Sheehan, Peter Arnett- Young Wax Correspondants
and their early Vietnam Battles (New York, First Vintage Books, 1995) opening remarks

APPENDIX
D ram atis Personae
Lyndon Baines Johnson. President o f the United States 1963-1969. Approved the increase
in troops to Vietnam in July 1965. Former representative in the House for Texas, and Senator
Became Senate Majority Leader. Famed for his manipulative skills and ability to reach a
compromise. Selected as John F.Kennedy's running mate in 1960 and ascended to the
Presidency in 1963 on his death.
R obert Strange M cNamara. Secretary of Defence 1961-1968. Fully supported the
President's decision to escalate the conflict in July 1965. Graduate from Harvard Business
School. After serving in the war effort, he was one of a group of young men known as th e '
whiz kids ' hired by Henry Ford to re-invigorate his company. Elected President of Ford
Motor Company in 1960. Thirteen weeks later, JFK asked him to be Secretary of Defence.
Known for his ruthlessness, efficiency and sharp analytical mind.
David Dean Rusk. Secretary of State 1961-1969. Urged LBJ to become more deeply
involved in Vietnam in the summer of 1965. A former academic, he served in World War II in
Far East and worked in the State Department after the war. Was appointed Assistant
Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs after the war. Afterwards, became, President of the
Rockefeller Foundation. In 1960 he was appointed Secretary of State by President Kennedy.
Was highly valued by LBJ for his loyalty, and commitment.
Maxwell D avenport Taylor. Chairman of the JCS and Ambassador to South Vietnam 19641965. Served in World War II, and climbed the hierarchy to become Army Chief of Staff.
Kennedy appointed him as his special military aide, and later as chair of the JCS. When
Ambassador Cabot Lodge left Saigon to run for theRepublican nomination, LBJ nominated
him for the ambassadorship to South Vietnam.
M cGeorge Bundy. Special Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs 19611966. After serving in the war, helped former Secretary of State Henry L. Stimson write his
memoirs, and entered academic life at Harvard. By the time he was thirty four he was
appointed Dean of the Faculty of Arts and Sciences at Harvard. Appointed by Kennedy, he
was retained by Johnson who admired his powerful intellect and his analytical skills. Strongly
urged an escalation of the conflict.
George W lldm an Ball. Under Secretary of State 1961-1966. Served in World War II on the
Strategic Bombing Command. After the war worked as a counsel to the French government.
John F. Kennedy appointed him Under Secretary o f State. He stayed on after Kennedy's
death, and struck up a good working relationship with the new President. Was the only one of
Johnson's main advisers to urge the President to seek a negotiated settlement in Vietnam.
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